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ABSTRACT
RECOVERING FROM HURRICANE KATRINA:
SMALL BUSINESS OWNERS CONQUER KATRINA:
A MIXED METHODOLOGY STUDY
by Penny Madonna Adams
May 2011
On August 29, 2005, residents of Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi's
Gulf Coast Regions faced death and destruction as Hurricane Katrina made
landfall. The hurricane presented numerous challenges to the Gulf Coast
Region; hence, many residents continue to rebuild more than five years later.
Small business owners, in particular, comprise one of the populations hardest hit.
Prior research identified barriers to recovery hindering small business
owners post-Hurricane Katrina. The purpose of the current research is to
determine how "recovered" small businesses overcame financial barriers postHurricane Katrina. This study examines the recovery process from the small
business owners' perspective and evaluates the strategies undertaken by
"recovered" owners prior to and after the storm. The researcher explores the
crisis planning, crisis management and resiliency frameworks, as well as the
impacts of issues encountered after the storm. Through the mixed methods
research design, this research investigates the lived experiences of small
business owners in Hancock County, Mississippi and offers effective recovery
strategies to future business owners threatened by natural disasters. The
ii

researcher utilized survey research and conducted five in-depth interviews to
capture business owners' responses to loss during the hurricane. Demographic
information was calculated and analyzed for the quantitative data and content
analysis occurred for the qualitative data.
Key findings indicate that successful small business owners utilized the
following strategies during the recovery process: expansion of customer base,
community collaboration, adjustment of business objectives and personal or selfinsurance. The findings of this research contribute to small business owners'
understanding of essential components of recovery; thus, improving recovery
timelines. The highlighted strategies also advance the understanding of the
relationship between crisis planning prior to a disastrous event and the increased
ability to recover after a crisis. Businesses in hurricane-prone areas continue to
face the threat of disaster; however, with knowledge and effective strategies from
this research, businesses have the tools to conquer the uncertainty with success.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA, 2002) predicts that
weather related disasters affect 28 million people annually, causing an average
of $16 million in damages and killing an average of 1,500 people in the United
States. On August 29, 2005, residents of Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi‘s
Gulf Coast Regions faced damages and devastation as Hurricane Katrina made
landfall. In the history of the United States, Hurricane Katrina remains the most
expensive natural disaster to strike the Gulf Region (Dass-Brailsford, 2008). The
U.S. Department of Transportation (2006) classified Hurricane Katrina as the
highest loss ever recorded from a single storm measured by loss of life,
destruction to property and economic hardship. With winds in excess of 150
miles per hour and 20-foot high waves, the storm destroyed the southern
coastline (Dass-Brailsford, 2008). This hurricane, like no other before it, passed
through the Gulf Coast Region destroying lives, leveling homes and businesses
and leaving thousands of survivors in disarray.
Hurricane Katrina ravaged property in several states, mostly in Louisiana
and Mississippi. In New Orleans, Louisiana, the storm surge caused the
breaching of levees. ―80% of the city of New Orleans was flooded with up to 20
feet of water‖ (Weems et al., 2008, p. 2296). The storm claimed over 1,600 lives
in Louisiana and left over 1,000 people missing (LA Department of Health and
Hospitals, 2006). Along the Mississippi Gulf Coast, approximately 12
communities experienced extensive destruction (Scurfield, 2008) with over 235
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confirmed deaths (Pender, 2005) and over 68,000 homes and businesses
destroyed (First 100 days, 2005a). The 34-foot storm-surge in western
Mississippi traveled in excess of 9 miles from the coast through rivers and
bayous causing extensive damage (Scurfield, 2008; Walsh, 2006). The
Mississippi coast experienced destructive winds and tornadoes, which rushed
through central areas of the state (Walsh, 2006). Many residents of the region
lost everything and continue to cope with the devastation. Hurricane Katrina
greatly affected business communities. Small business owners, in particular,
comprise one of the populations hardest hit.
Every year, small business owners across the U.S. suffer major losses as
a direct consequence of natural disasters. Insurance firms usually underestimate
losses by measuring only insured losses. Typically, ―loss estimates exclude
uninsured business interruption losses, income lost during post-event recovery
and losses to owners‘ capital assets when businesses fail as a direct result of the
event‖ (Alesch, Holly, Mittler & Nagy, 2001, p.4). In the Gulf Coast Region, like
many other communities, small businesses employ large numbers of employees.
Losses caused by disasters drastically affect the viability of employment for these
workers. According to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Hurricane Katrina
disrupted approximately 125,000 small businesses across the Gulf Coast
Region. All employees of the 125,000 businesses experienced impacts. Many
business owners, as well as their former employees, continue efforts to rebuild
personal and professional lives (Loten, 2006). Many business owners lost
employees and customers. Temporary closure of the businesses affected

3
owners, as well as their communities. According to a local small business owner,
Katrina has affected everything —from purchasing a gallon of milk to buying a
truckload of sheetrock (Hill, 2008). The entire community continues to experience
the impacts of the Katrina disaster.
Statement of the Problem
Across the U.S and in many other nations, businesses and industries of all
sizes experience the effects of natural disasters. Although traumatic affects of
initial damages eventually subside, the recovery process requires small business
owners to begin to rearrange and reestablish the mission, goals, and
infrastructure of the business. Since August 2005, the Mississippi Gulf Coast
small business community faces the overwhelming challenge of recovering from
the Hurricane Katrina disaster. Mississippi, Louisiana and Alabama coasts
experienced several storms over the last several decades; however, the recovery
process remains tedious and prolonged (K. Jett, personal communication,
February 17, 2009). Bureaucratic guidelines hinder the process for receiving
government aid. Current processes cause small business owners enormous
frustration and many relinquish the business before receiving needed help to
continue business operations (K. Jett, personal communication, February 2,
2009).
Existing literature on natural disaster impact specifically related to small
business is limited. Much of the literature aims at expanding the understanding of
how businesses respond to natural disasters. The majority of the available
literature falls into three categories: a) why some businesses recover, b) why
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others do not recover (Alesch et al., 2001), and c) a listing of the barriers that
obstruct recovery efforts (Runyan, 2006). Alesch et al. (2001) suggests
individual businesses that are stronger and more financially stable as they enter
a period of disaster recovery, and those able to adapt to a ―new norm‖ following
the disaster, are more likely to recover and continue business (Alesch et al.,
2001, p. 66). The literature describes serious infrastructure problems impeding
recovery, lack of access to capital for recovery problems, vulnerability to cash
flow interruption and problems caused by federal assistance agencies as the
strongest barriers to recovery (Runyan, 2006).
Research focusing specifically on determining how small business owners
surviving natural disasters overcome the barriers impeding the recovery process
remains scarce.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to determine strategies ―recovered‖ small
business owners in Hancock County used to overcome financial barriers postHurricane Katrina. For this study, the definition of recovery includes businesses
generally profitable within its new economic environment; thus, establishing
sufficient viability to meet defined objectives and continues to conduct business
at least one year post disastrous event (Alesch et al., 2001). Runyan (2006)
determined barriers to recovery and development of a strategic plan to conquer
identified barriers remains needful. The research captures small business
owners‘ responses to business loss during the worst natural disaster in the

5
history of the Gulf Coast and identifies attributes contributing to their recovery
and resiliency.
Research Objectives
This study examines small business owners‘ strategies for recovery from
Hurricane Katrina. The research objectives (hereafter referred to as RO) include
the following:
RO-1: Determine strategies ―recovered‖ small business owners in
Hancock County, Mississippi implemented during Hurricane Katrina
recovery relative to:
v1. lack of access to capital for recovery post-Hurricane Katrina.
V2.

vulnerability to cash flow post-Hurricane Katrina.

RO-2: Identify strategies ―recovered‖ small business owners in Hancock
County, Mississippi, implemented pre-Hurricane Katrina in
preparation for future disasters.
RO-3: Identify strategies ―recovered‖ small business owners in Hancock
County, Mississippi, implemented post-Hurricane Katrina in
preparation for future disasters.
RO-4: Identify characteristics of a resilient small business owner as
perceived by ―recovered‖ small business owners in Hancock
County, Mississippi.
Figure 1.1 presents the conceptual framework depicting the research objectives
of this study.
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Theoretical/Conceptual Framework
Framework
Theoretical Framework

Hurricane Katrina Disaster

Financial
Barriers
to Katrina
Recovery
Runyan,
2006

Vulnerability
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Lack of
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Capital for
Recovery

Strategies
for
Recovery
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Recovered
Small Business
Alesch, Holly, Mittler, & Nagy,
2001

Profitable
within new
economic
environment

Conducting
business for
one year
post-event

Crisis Management

Crisis Planning

Theoretical Framework

Resiliency Theory

Figure 1.1 Conceptual Framework Katrina Recovery Strategies
Three theories support the conceptual framework of the study: crisis
management, crisis planning and resiliency theories. Experts identify crisis
planning as the initial stage of creating behavioral readiness for effective crisis
management (Elsubbaugh et al., 2004; Smits & Ally, 2003).
Critical to an organizations‘ response, planning ahead of a crisis speeds
up the recovery time after the crisis. Researchers believe that, to a certain extent,
an organization‘s ability to respond successfully to a crisis depends on the type
of planning engaged in before the crisis (Pearson & Clair, 1998). Advanced
planning can better prepare organizations for essential decisions made once in
crisis mode. However, having a crisis plan in place does not fully prepare an
organization for a disaster. A well thought-out management plan also remains
essential for recovery.
Crisis management, commonly defined as the study of the relationship
between organizations and the handling of crisis events, remains important (Hale
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et al., 2005). When done effectively, crisis management can and does shorten
the recovery phase (Fink, 1986). Crisis management works to minimize the
impact of a crisis and helps an organization gain control of the situation
(Caponigro, 2000). Effective management remains vital to the stability and
resiliency of communities and organizations.
―Resilience theory addresses the strengths that people and systems
demonstrate that enable them to rise above adversity‖ (VanBreda, 2001, p.1).
According to the Community and Regional Research Initiative (CARRI) 2009, a
resilient community anticipates problems and opportunities, reduces
vulnerabilities, responds effectively, fairly and legitimately and recovers rapidly,
safely and fairly. The Mississippi Gulf Coast experienced several natural
disasters within the last several decades, including the great Flood of 1927 and
Hurricane Camille. Based on the coast‘s ability to encounter and recover from
past disasters, the community possesses the ability to remain resilient in spite of
economic hardships. However, the need remains for researchers to examine the
recovery process and find more efficient recovery strategies for future events.
Theoretically, when implemented prior to a natural disaster, crisis
planning, crisis management and resiliency frameworks increase chances of
effective response and recovery. However, recent research purports barriers to
business owners‘ recovery from natural disasters (Runyan, 2006). The
framework of this research examines the issues that delay business recovery
processes, while identifying recovery strategies. Research suggests finances
represent the most extensive barrier to recovery (Runyan, 2006).
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Financial Barriers to Recovery
Formative research on Hurricane Katrina‘s impacts on small business
owners in the Mississippi and Louisiana Gulf Coast Regions provides pertinent
information to the business community. Runyan‘s research identifies barriers to
recovery that small business owners faced post-Hurricane Katrina. Runyan‘s
variables include: serious infrastructure problems impeding recovery, problems
caused by federal assistance agencies, vulnerability to cash flow, and lack of
access to capital for recovery. Two variables that extend beyond the business
owner‘s control include: infrastructure problems and problems caused by federal
agencies. For example, business owners could neither prepare for, nor mend
damage to roads and bridges. Similarly, a business owner could not prepare for
delays caused by changing governmental guidelines regarding recovery.
Therefore, the present study focuses on Runyan‘s two variables related to
financial recovery (lack of access to capital and vulnerability to cash flow) of
which the business owner has some control. Chapter Two presents specifics of
the two financial variables related to recovery.
Recovered Small Business
Alesch et al. (2001) establishes the following definition of recovery: a) the
business is profitable within the new economic environment; b) the business
remains viable to meet the objectives defined for it, and c) self sufficiency
established for at least one year post-event. This study utilizes the preceding
definition to determine business recovery. A natural disaster changes the
economic environment of a geographical location. A profitable business is one
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that generates sufficient revenue to meet costs and provides a modest return to
the owner within the new economic environment. Secondly, following the major
impacts of a natural disaster, it is permissible to modify business objectives as
long as the business continues to meet the new objectives (Alesch et al., 2001).
Lastly, sustainability remains essential for recovery. A recovered business
continues operation, in spite of economic hardships, for at least one-year post
disaster. The following definitions provide context for this research project.
Definition of Terms
The following definitions provide uniformity and understanding of terms
throughout the study.
1.

Hurricane: A hurricane is a large, organized weather system that

forms over warm ocean water. Hurricanes have a pronounced circulation around
a calm center with sustained surface winds of 75 miles per hour or more.
Hurricanes generally form in the summer months, when the oceans are at their
warmest. The Atlantic hurricane season begins June 1 and ends November 30
(La Greca, Sevin & Sevin, 2005).
2.

Small business: The Small Business Administration (SBA)

classifies a small business as independently owned and operated but not
dominant in its field of operation. A business typically maintaining revenue
considerably less than comparable units within a larger corporation and
employing fewer than 100 employees (SBA, 2009).
3.

Crisis Planning: Smits and Ally (2003) identify crisis planning as the

first stage of creating behavioral readiness for crisis management. Crisis
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planning encompasses the organizational preparation for a disastrous event;
hence, appropriate planning increases an organizations‘ operational efficiency
(Childs, 2008).
4.

Crisis Management: Crisis management is the study of how

organizations handle crisis events (Hale, 2005). Crisis management is defined
as the function conducted by organizations to react to and recover from events
that threatened the security of an organization (Whitman & Mattord, 2003). The
practice minimizes the impact of a crisis and helps an organization gain control of
the situation through effective decision-making (Caponigro, 2000).
5.

Resilience: The process of adapting well in the face of disaster,

trauma, threats and high stress periods of time (APA, 2004).
Limitations of the Study
Research participants were members of the Old Town Business
Merchants Association in Bay St. Louis, Mississippi. The database consists of 40
small business owners from Hancock County, Mississippi. Experiencing the most
extensive damage and suffering nearly complete destruction (K. Jett, personal
communication, February 2, 2009). Hancock County serves as the location of
focus for this research study. In addition, due to time, cost limitations and the
availability of owners that remained and reopened in the area, research focuses
solely on ―recovered‖ small business owners from Hancock County, Mississippi.
Business owners that lost businesses and did not re-open after Katrina were
unavailable and were less likely to provide information specific to this study‘s
objectives.
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Delimitations of the Study
This study is bounded by the responses and experiences of only small
business owners who operated businesses in Hancock County, Mississippi
during Hurricane Katrina. Selection from participants who are members of the
Old Town Bay St. Louis Merchant‘s Association limits the study. Likewise,
bounding the number of participants interviewed in and a purposeful sample
selection process also limit the study.
Significance of the Research
This research analyzes the lived experiences of small business owners
affected by Hurricane Katrina and develops two-fold improvement strategies.
First, it further assists government officials, community members and future small
business owners in understanding the nature of the impact of disasters on
communities, such as those in the Gulf Coast Region. The present research
adds effective recovery strategies utilized by business owners during Hurricane
Katrina to the empirical literature and helps to improve recovery efforts postdisaster. Understanding why and how small businesses recovered following
Hurricane Katrina helps to devise strategies and blueprints to aid future small
business owners in surviving similar disastrous events. This research provides
small business owners specific recovery strategies used by business owners
who experienced and recovered from the impacts of Hurricane Katrina.
The long-term, more theoretical motivation of this study advances the
understanding of the relationship between crisis planning prior to a disastrous
event and the increased ability to recover after a crisis. Moreover, the short-term,
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practical goals include providing practical recovery strategies and identifying the
necessary characteristics for a small business owner to increase resiliency after
a disastrous event such as Hurricane Katrina. The outcomes of this study help
document recovery techniques and strategies, adding to the crisis planning and
management literature with specific focus on small business recovery.
Summary
On August 29, 2005, the Mississippi Gulf Coast experienced
unprecedented destruction and devastation from Hurricane Katrina. The
hurricane caused large-scale damage to the infrastructure of the area, but more
importantly to the lives of the people who called the coast home. Hurricane
Katrina records highest losses ever from a single storm measured by economic
hardship, loss of life and destruction to property, (U.S. Department of
Transportation, 2006). Natural disasters have an enormous impact on
communities. Communities must understand the impacts and develop plans to
neutralize them. This research assists business owners, community leaders and
government officials in preparing for future disasters by investigating the real life
experiences of ―recovered‖ small business owners in Hancock County,
Mississippi. Finally, the research yields recovery strategies for existing and
future business owners.
Chapter II presents an overview of the extant literature; Chapter III
discusses the methodology of the study; Chapter IV presents the findings and
analysis of the data; and Chapter V contains summary, conclusions, implications
and recommendations for future research.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
This mixed methods study adds to the body of knowledge regarding
recovery of small business owners in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and explores
strategies utilized by ―recovered‖ small business owners to overcome hindrances
to recovery. The research investigates the lived experiences of small business
owners in Hancock County, Mississippi and offers recovery strategies for future
business owners facing impacts of natural disasters.
The literature review includes an explanation of the crisis planning and
management theoretical framework. Implications for recovery and a description
of the history and resiliency of the Mississippi Gulf Coast follow the discussion of
the theoretical framework. Additionally, the review includes a description of the
impact of Hurricane Katrina on the coast and expounds on the impact specifically
on Hancock County, Mississippi. The researcher explores data on the economic
impact of Hurricane Katrina on small business owners and issues encountered
after Katrina.
Crisis Planning and Management
According to Webster‘s dictionary (2009), a crisis is ―a crucial time‖ that
causes a ―turning point for better or worse‖; a paroxysmal attack of pain, distress,
or disordered function; especially one with the distinct possibility of a highly
undesirable outcome (n. p.). A crisis is an event that causes instability in the
actions, plans or strategies of a system and requires quick decisions. Based on
the extant literature, a crisis event is characterized by low probability, ambiguity,
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high consequence and decision making under time pressure (Pearson & Clair,
1998). A crisis occurs when an organization requires quick responses to address
threatened interests and the effect of practical actions is uncertain (Coleman,
2004). Crises force managers to make quick decisions based on little information
while encountering rapid changes. Deutsch (1963) warned, ―While moderate
rates of change or disequilibrium may be dealt with successfully, many
governments and organizations find themselves unable to control their behavior
effectively in times of rapid change—this may put excessive load upon their
decision-making system‖ ( p.190). Quick decisions during turbulent times are
critical for the survival of organizations. When a crisis hits an organization, the
effects can be detrimental if recovery plans are not established (Offers, 1998).
Therefore, organizations must employ crisis planning and crisis management
concepts to help better prepare for disastrous events.
Crisis planning and crisis management are multidisciplinary in nature
(Mitroff, 1988; Shrivastava, 1993). The literature crosses numerous academic
disciplines including accounting, management, finance and many others (Hale et
al., 2005). The theoretical frameworks of crisis planning and management
represent constantly evolving and inexact fields of study. Human and social
science or sociology disciplines support crisis planning and management by
providing a theoretical foundation for the field of study (Roux-Dufort, 2007).
Ironically, ―the concept of crisis has never made it into mainstream organization
theory‖ (Roux-Dufort, 2007, p. 106). In the field of organization theory, crisis
management is frequently isolated for four main reasons. First, it is a non-
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cumulative field of research characterized by little theorization and vague
definitions. Perceived as ‗events‘, which distance it from becoming a more
structured model, crisis management suffers from a methodological monolithism
(Roux-Dufort, 2007).
Non-cumulative field of research characterized by little theorization. Most
often used to amplify research on other concepts, crisis, in itself, does not serve
as an object of research in organizational theory. Although used as a catalyst,
crisis research is seldom the subject of the theorization necessary to highlight its
nature and become ingrained in organizational theory (Roux-Dufort, 2007).
Vague definitions. Defined as an unexpected, unpredictable event that
takes the form of acute and painful manifestations (Morin, 1976), characteristics
of organizational crisis are based essentially on the nature of its consequences
and implications. The characteristics provide theoretical insufficiencies (Forgues
& Roux-Dufort, 1998). Definitions for the concept of crisis remain vague, making
it difficult for researchers to define a concrete framework for the discipline (RouxDufort, 2007). With weak definitions and theoretical insufficiencies, crisis
research tends to lose legitimacy (Roux-Dufort, 2007).
Methodological monolithism. Case studies of major industrial disasters
serve as root references for crisis literature (Roux-Dufort, 2007). A limitation of
the foundational literature includes the existence of more information on the
actual event than on the organizations experiencing the event. These studies,
although having a major impact on crisis research, have somehow limited
researchers to an event centered approach, focusing mainly on the incidents and
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little on the contributions of crises to understanding organizational functioning
(Roux-Dufort, 2007).
Event centered approach. Shrivastava (1992) suggests that crisis
management based largely on an event-centered approach causes managers to
mistake the event for the crisis itself. ―Seeing a crisis as an event has
disadvantaged the discipline of crisis management because it leads to the belief
that the event prevails over everything else‖ (Roux-Dufort, 2007 p. 108).
―Focusing on the event and its intensity prevents researchers from closely
examining and questioning the functioning of the organization, and instead,
induces them to study the different ways to deal with the surprise, urgency and
disturbance‖ (Roux-Dufort, 2007 p. 106). Crisis planning and management
remains isolated and therefore not closely associated with mainstream
organization theory. To develop a solid theoretical foundation, crisis planning
and management must explore the origin of events and post-event futures.
Organizational theorists believe crisis management must shift from an
event-centered approach to a crisis process approach in order to gain
acceptance into the field of organizational theory (Roux-Dufort, 2007;
Shrivastava, 1992). The crisis process approach considers a crisis a long
process that happens over a period of time and suddenly manifests itself under
the influence of a ―precipitating‖ event (Fink, 1986; Gatot & Jacques, 1999;
Mitroff & Pearson, 1993; Roux-Dufort, 2007). The crisis process approach
advances the idea that a crisis develops in phases, not one event, and studying
each phase can reveal weaknesses and strengths in the organization. This
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approach recognizes the benefits of initiating the development of crisis
management and organizational theory. ―If crisis management only sees crisis
as punctual events, it then runs the risk of being perceived as a science of the
exceptional‖ (Roux-Dufort, 2007 p. 108).
Despite struggles establishing a solid theoretical foundation, crisis
planning and crisis management adds efficiency to the response and recovery
efforts of businesses. A crisis is a time of great instability for organizations;
therefore, organizations engage in crisis planning prior to the presentation of a
crisis event. The resulting crisis management plans counteract the instability that
a crisis event can present. Under the crisis process approach, analysis of the
preparation phase applies, although natural disasters usually happen suddenly.
Survival and recovery of an organization in the wake of a crisis, such as
Hurricane Katrina, often depends upon the crisis planning and management
plans set in place prior to a disastrous event. In the wake of crisis situations, poor
planning and management decisions serve as key sources of organizational
failure (Booth, 1990; McKinley, 1993; Smith, 1990). Although many businesses
do not plan for disasters, research shows that organizations fail mainly because
a gap exists between planned actions and actual activities undertaken in a major
crisis (Quarantelli, 1988). ―Studies of disasters have demonstrated that
organizational officials do not always distinguish between the two processes,
which result in consequent negative results‖ (Quarantelli, 1988, p. 374). The
assumption that an organization can merely implement pre-developed plans
during the crisis remains incorrect. The aforementioned gap often serves as a
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hindrance to the organization‘s ability to effectively prepare for and respond to a
disastrous event. Quarantelli (1988) explains the differences between crisis
planning and crisis management.
Crisis Planning
Alexander Graham Bell once said, ―Before anything else, preparation is
the key to success‖ (Graham-Bell, 2009, n.p.). The crisis planning literature
bestows much attention to planning for a crisis as a key to positive outcomes
(Fink, 1986; Hale et al., 2005; Quarantelli, 1988). Crisis planning serves as a
blueprint or a road map for organizations experiencing a crisis event. Smits and
Ally (2003) identify crisis planning as the first stage of creating behavioral
readiness for crisis management. Similarly, Elsubbaugh, Fildes and Rose (2004)
place crisis preparation as the initial phase to effective crisis management and
argue that organizations must strategically prepare to respond to crisis events
with appropriate planning. Investing in crisis preparation yields immediate
returns by increasing the organization‘s operational efficiency (Childs, 2008).
Typical components of crisis planning include: a designated crisis team (Pearson
& Clair, 1998); emergency communication procedures (Borda & Mackey-Kallis,
2004; Pasek, 2002); and organization specific disaster training including drills
and simulations (Bonin & Lagadec, 2000; Perry & Lindell, 2003).
Some scholars suggest developing a crisis team composed of senior level
experts as an important step towards experiencing successful outcomes from a
crisis event (Mitroff & Pearson, 1993). A crisis team represents a cross-functional
group of stakeholders from all major aspects of the business charged with
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leading crisis planning and coordination (Bonin & Lagadec, 2000; Kash &
Darling, 1998; Mitroff & Pearson, 1993). Essential to the team is a permanent
central core of senior level executives; however, different types of crisis may
require different types of team members. Therefore, Fink (1986) suggests the
first task of the team includes constructing a list of potential colleagues to serve
on the crisis team, depending on the crisis at hand. For example, financial crises
require financial experts while natural disasters require experts equipped to
handle environmental disasters. According to Hutchins, Annulis & Gaudet
(2008), the crisis management team‘s primary duty includes devising a crisis
management plan. ―An effective crisis management plan presets certain key
decisions on the mechanical portions of the crisis--those aspects that rarely vary-and leaves executives free to manage the content portion of the crisis--those
unique to the crisis-- with unfettered hands‖ (Fink, 1986, p. 55). A management
plan, which includes fixed determinations addressing the mechanicals, presents
benefits. Crisis mechanicals include: determining roles and responsibilities of
personnel at all levels of the business, deciding and assigning individuals to the
organization‘s crisis management team, as well as, outlining first response steps.
―Each person must understand the importance and necessity of contingency
planning and response to a disaster, and know what his or her role will be‖
(Childs, 2008, p. 20). The crisis management team further develops the plan by
first identifying and assessing organizational crisis readiness. Plan expansion
occurs by developing the processes and infrastructure needed to identify and
manage both anticipated and unanticipated crisis events, and by formulating
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recovery plans for various crisis events. For example, Childs (2008) suggests
that organizations establish a remote disaster recovery site. Mitroff & Pearson
(1993) also suggest that crisis management teams may help facilitate decisionmaking and actions by accelerating the flow of resources during a crisis.
Likewise, a trained crisis management team can aid in the flow of information;
hence, facilitating more effective communication.
Hale, Dulek & Hale (2005) depict crisis communication as the process of
transmitting information about an ongoing crisis event to stakeholders. Effective
communication aids the decision-making process and supports organizational
decisions regarding sharing information with internal and external sources. The
decision process becomes more efficient when the business recognizes
requirements to minimize damage and potential liabilities (Childs, 2008). Typical
components of crisis communication plans include ready access to emergency
contact information for management, employees, retirees and emergency
stakeholders. This information, when easily accessible, enables the operational
portion of the organization (building and facility access, work schedule changes
and alternate office locations) to flow smoothly. This helps to inform employees
and stakeholders about employee relational issues, such as employee
assistance programs, travel and relocation (Hewitt Associates‘ Report on Crisis
Communication, 2004). Three basic questions for an organization to address in
a crisis communication plan include the following: Who is responsible for
notifying employees and the media? Who will determine and notify needed local,
state or federal government agencies? Who will serve as backups in the case of
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unreachable first line employees? Failure to answer these questions and other
communication failures may prove detrimental to the organization and external
people affected by the organization. Perfection of communication and other
crisis strategies and techniques require practice.
Shaw & Harrald (2004) state that crisis training and drills serve as
exercises to develop organizational crisis awareness and preparedness. In order
to identify and mitigate unanticipated risks, organizations must test disaster
preparedness plans (Childs, 2008). Research notes various examples of
common crisis training sessions, including but not limited to the following: CPR
and first aid, fire suppression and evacuation, procedures for handling hazardous
chemicals and assisting persons with disabilities during disasters (Fegley &
Victor, 2005). Organizations use a wide range of interaction and simulations to
train employees for crisis events (Peterson & Perry, 1999).
Crisis training professionals administer training ranging from simple roleplay activities to functional exercises that involve actual tests of one or more
parts of the crisis plan. Sometimes full-scale exercises test major crisis planning
functions in the field (Hutchins et al., 2008). Organizational members should
receive skill development through frequent training and development sessions to
update crisis-related competencies (Smits & Ally, 2003). Training remains
important to the overall success of the crisis-planning phase; however small
businesses tend to have fewer financial resources and less access to capital to
plan for a crisis (Kirchhoff, 1994).
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Although not a new organizational concept, very little research exists on
crisis planning by small businesses. ―Historically, researchers focused on
planning and management activities within larger organizations‖ (Spillan &
Hough, 2003, p. 400). Available research reveals evidence of minimal proactive
crisis planning by small business owners. A study conducted by Spillan and
Hough (2003) suggests crisis planning receives little attention in small
businesses and for the most part, not until after a disaster strikes does a small
business owner realize the need for effective crisis planning. Typically, small
business owners utilize insurance coverage as their crisis planning function
(Spillan & Hough, 2003). While insurance can definitely protect against extensive
cost implications, coverage remains insufficient in terms of assuring the recovery
of a business (Simbo, 1993). Areas not covered by insurance policies include,
‗soft dollar‘ items, such as low employee morale, worker unrest and stress,
increased worker compensation claims and increased absenteeism. Yet, these
items drastically affect the survival of a business (Fink, 1986). Small business
owners rarely focus on crisis planning because many believe catastrophic events
will only happen to other organizations (Mitroff, 1989). The threat of such an
event seldom seems realistic until after the crisis strikes. Crisis planning often
begins after the crisis strikes (Chastang, 2000), notably too late. A recent survey
of 2,500 small business owners conducted by Office Depot (2007) found that
71% did not have a disaster preparedness plan and nearly two-thirds stated they
did not need one. Historical facts reveal businesses typically do not resume
within 72 hours of a disaster; however, 63% expressed confidence that they

23
would resume within that time span (Office Depot, 2007). The majority of the
crisis planning or management literature discusses familiar patterns to disaster
response; however, organizations remain unprepared in crises. ―To prepare for
crisis events, planning is crucial to aligning people, technology, and
organizational culture to mitigate potential losses resulting from a crisis‖
(Hutchins et al., 2008, p. 47). Small business owners acknowledge the
importance of crisis planning; however, alone it cannot bring the business to a
fully recovered status. Likewise, crisis management remains important to the
success of a business as crisis planning.
Crisis Management
The academic community struggle for consensus on the definition of crisis
management (Kouzmin, 2008). Hale (2005) offers the following definition: the
study of how organizations handle crisis events. According to Whitman and
Mattord (2003) crisis management serves as a sub-function of contingency
planning, defined holistically as the planning conducted by an organization to
react to and recover from events that threaten the security of an organization and
the subsequent restoration to normal modes of business. The above definition
shares similarities to others in that crisis management deals with the actions
taken during and after a disaster (Whitman & Mattord, 2003). According to
Caponigro (2000) crisis management functions minimize the impact of a crisis
and help an organization gain control of the situation through effective decision
making.
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Crisis management includes making the right decisions to help an
organization continue to reach strategic goals while in the midst of chaos. The
concept involves curtailing the impact of a crisis on the organization through
decision making; hence, ―in managing a crisis you are managing decisions‖
(Fink, 1986, p. 84). Every business benefits by having a crisis management plan
in place as organizations transition through crisis phases (Fink, 1986; Hutchins et
al., 2008).
Although several different crisis management models appear in the
literature, a consensus exists among field experts in the following three
distinctive crisis phases: prevention/preparation, response and recovery (Elliott et
al., 2005; Smith, 1990). The majority of crisis management models incorporate
the three phases, albeit with different titles. For example, Smith (1990)
developed a three-phase crisis management model indicating how crises
typically unfold. Smith‘s model includes the following three phases: crisis of
management phase, operational crisis and the crisis of legitimation phase. This
model provides a similar representation of the relationships among the crisis
management steps.
Prevention/preparation. The prevention phase presents a pre-crisis stage
when an organization can prepare for an upcoming preventable or nonpreventable disaster, such as Hurricane Katrina. This prevention phase leads to
the crisis event in which the organization fails to take account for an impending
situation. Hence, businesses suppose traditional precautions are enough to
prepare effectively for a disaster. However, Alesch et al. (2001) suggests that
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traditional precautions taken by most organizations in the wake of a disastrous
event will not significantly increase the probability of business survival. ―The
failure of organizations to recognize and respond to the presence of early crisis
indicators in this stage, often cause substantial losses in revenue, reputation and
human life‖ (Hutchins et al., 2008, p. 30). Crisis preparation serves as the initial
phase of the crisis management process. Many experts argue that organizations
must be strategically prepared to respond to a crisis event in order to manage
effectively (Elsubbaugh et al., 2004; Smits & Ally, 2003).
Response. Management literature indicates that organizations are
naturally reactive concerning potential future crises, perhaps because they
believe crises are unlikely to happen to them (Mitroff et al., 1989; Pearson &
Mitroff, 1993; Penrose, 2000; Shrivastava, 1993). Many organizations are not
able to stop a crisis in the prevention phase and hence, find themselves in the
second phase. The response phase encompasses the immediate minutes,
hours and days after a crisis event occurs. While this phase begins after the
crisis, significant risk of immediate damage remains present (Hale et al., 2005).
The following objectives represent the response phase: to prevent the worsening
of the crisis, to generate a climate of support for those involved, and to attempt to
gain control of the situation (Caponigro, 2000; Smith, 1990). ―At this point,
organizations shift their resources and efforts to minimizing damage to the
environment, facilities and people‖ (Hale et al., 2005, p. 113).
There are many crisis management response approaches; however,
several studies produce strong arguments for the ideal crisis management
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response approach. Fines (1985) and Kauffman (1999) present two studies that
provide recommendations for organizations to follow when facing a crisis.
Table 2.1
Fines’ Ideal Crisis Management Response

Crisis Management Elements
1. Set a broad strategy in advance
2. Respond quickly
3. Train spokespersons in advance
4. Seek third party support
5. Centralize the spokesperson‘s function
Note: From ―Crisis forecasting: What's the worst that could happen?‖ by S. Fines, 1985,
Management Review, 75, pp. 52-56.

Fines (1985) identifies five elements essential to an effective crisis
management response. Fines stresses the importance of developing a strategy
and providing prior training. When prepared in advance, organizations respond
quickly (Coombs, 1999). By responding quickly, trained spokespersons can fill
the information void created by a crisis with facts (Fines, 1985). When an
organization responds slowly, speculation and misinformation will fill the
information void; which can exacerbate the crisis (Coombs, 1999). Other crisis
management research supports Fines‘ findings (see Table 2.1).
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Table 2.2
Kauffmans’ Ideal Crisis Management Response
Effective Crisis Response
1. Respond quickly
2. Tell the truth
3. Provide a constant flow of information, especially to key publics
Note: From ―Adding fuel to the fire: NASA's crisis communications regarding Apollo 1,‖ by J.
Kauffman, 1999, Public Relations Review, 25(4), pp. 421-432.

In 1999, Kauffman generalized an effective crisis response strategy from
research conducted on NASA‘s Apollo 1 crisis. An ineffective response phase
can contribute to the credibility of an organization. In order to prevent diminished
organizational credibility, organizations must provide information, before if
possible, during and after the crisis event.
Both Kauffman and Fines agree that for a smooth transition through the
response phase, organizations must be prepared to respond quickly with a
constant and consistent flow of accurate information. Smooth transition also
requires advanced training and outside political and social support. Using the key
elements found in Fines and Kauffman‘s research, organizations can transition
smoothly through the response phase and eventually begin to focus on recovery.
Recovery. Fink (1986) and Offer‘s (1998) reviews of crisis preparedness
indicate that 50% of all businesses will not survive without an adequate business
recovery plan. The presence of an effective recovery plan increases business
success (Fink, 1986). Pedone (1997) indicates that 90% of businesses without a
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disaster recovery plan fail within two years after a disaster. Initially known as the
clean up phase, the recovery phase (Fink, 1986) seeks to minimize impacts of
the crisis on an organization (Elliot et al., 2005). Additionally, the recovery phase
involves attempts to learn from the event internally while handling the event
externally. During this time, organizations make needed corrections in
management plans and return to a sense of normalcy. Communities, and those
indirectly involved in a crisis, attempt to return to normal routines (Home Office,
1997, p. 3). However, organizations often cannot apply normal emergency
management practices in every disaster event because of the uniqueness of
each disaster. Disasters typically do not follow set patterns (Hills, 1998);
therefore, requiring more than improvisation of existing plans. ―The defining
features of a disaster can change and organizations may be forced to take
unprecedented measures going far beyond a simple extension of normal
responses‖ (Hill, 1998, p. 164). Oftentimes, a need to develop new approaches
guides actions in a continuing emergency (Turner, 1995). The disaster‘s scale
and intensity increases when organizations are unprepared (Horlick-Jones,
1994).
Tendency to blame other organizations presents itself as the second
characteristic of a recovery stage. Smith (1990) characterizes this period as a
time of blame appropriation and scapegoating. Unfortunately, in an attempt to
legitimize organizational operating procedures and management styles most
organizations appropriate blame and search for a scapegoat (Elliott et al., 2005;
Smith, 1990). Shane, Lipton & Drew (2005) highlights this stage in an article
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entitled, ―After Failures, Government Officials Play Blame Game.‖ In an article
published days after Hurricane Katrina, Louisiana state and local authorities
blamed FEMA after failing to deliver urgently needed soldiers, helicopters, food
and water. A spokesperson from State Senator Mary Landrieu‘s office insisted
FEMA failed to provide critical assistance. New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin states
that he held the federal government responsible for failing to deliver relief
supplies and personnel quickly. Although, the federal government did take some
responsibility for the hesitancy in the decision-making, Louisiana‘s Governor
Kathleen Blanco refused to sign an agreement to share control with National
Guard forces. The Governors‘ alleged lack of cooperation hindered critically
needed progress. During this phase, Governor Blanco sought both to secure
legitimacy and to take preventive measures. The ―blame game‖ occurs often
during the recovery phase and hinders the recovery process (Elliott et al., 2005;
Smith, 1990).
In an attempt to prepare effectively for crisis events, organizations
transition through the aforementioned crisis management stages. A disastrous
event changes large and small organizations even with the best preparedness
plans and crisis management techniques. An organization‘s ability to be resilient
often relies on its ability to prepare, manage and adapt to transitions during the
crisis (Alesch et al., 2001). Resiliency remains a familiar concept to many small
businesses within the Mississippi Gulf Coast (Bower, 2006).
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Resiliency Theory
The American Psychological Association (2004) defines resilience as ―the
process of adapting well in the face of adversity, trauma, threats, or even
significant sources of stress‖ (n. p.). Resilience suggests the ability to adapt well
in the face of disaster, trauma and high stress periods of time (APA, 2004).
―Resilience theory addresses the strengths that people and systems demonstrate
that enable them to rise above adversity‖ (VanBreda, 2001, p. 1). A number of
longitudinal studies appear in the psychology, psychiatry, education and
sociology literature (VanBreda, 2001) documenting the phenomenon of resiliency
over time; however, the impetus for resiliency research initially stemmed from
research of at risk-youth and their ability to survive after experiencing adversity
(Resiliency Model, 2009).
Smith and Werner (1992), child psychologists at The University of
California, present an influential longitudinal study. Smith and Werner followed a
group of children born in Kauai, Hawaii from 1955 to 1985 and found that about
one-third of the students affected by major risk conditions escaped to adulthood
without much permanent damage. Like this research, most resiliency research
demonstrates many high-risk students have the capacity to overcome adversity
and succeed in a supportive environment (Wolin & Wolin, 1993). Social and
environmental support factors serve as the foundation of resilience in individuals
(Henderson, 1997). ―Social support is the role that individuals or resources
within a community play in the life of an individual‖ (VanBreda, 2001, p. 150).
Cobb (1982) identifies four kinds of support systems needed for individuals to
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show resilience: social, emotional, esteem and network support. The support
systems help individuals adapt to environmental stressors. However, research
shows that ―social support is more important than all the others put together‖
(Cobb, 1982, p. 190). Theoretically, socially supported individuals are better able
to adapt to environmental stressors than people who do not receive support
(VanBreda, 2001). However, researchers recognize the field of resilience as a
multifaceted field of study (VanBreda, 2001). Both individuals and communities
embrace the resiliency attribute (Resiliency Model, 2009).
Recently, researchers acknowledge a community as a standalone system
(Blankenship, 1998; Bowen, 1998; Bowen & Martin, 1998; McKnight, 1997).
Bowen (1998) defines community as ―a network of informal relationships
between people connected to each other by kinship, common interest,
geographic proximity, friendship, occupation, or giving and receiving of services
or various combinations of these‖ (pp. 3-4). Conceptions of community resilience
remain tentative and underdeveloped (VanBreda, 2001); however, extant
literature offers several definitions for community resilience. Bowen (1998)
defines community resilience as ―the ability of a community facing normative or
non-normative adversity or the consequences of adversity to establish, maintain,
or regain an expected or satisfactory range of functioning that is equal to or is
better than prestressor functioning‖ (p. 5).
The Community and Regional Research Initiative on Resilient
Communities (CARRI), a regional program with national implications for how
communities and regions prepare for, respond to and recover from catastrophic
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events, offers a working definition of a resilient community. CARRI defines
community resilience as ―a community or region‘s capability to prepare for, and
respond to, and recover from significant multi-hazard threats with minimum
damage to public safety and health, the economy and national security‖
(Wilbanks, 2007). According to CARRI (2009), characteristics of a resilient
community include having the ability to: quickly reopen businesses and return
citizens to work, restore other essential services, and minimize the loss or
damage to life and property. A resilient community has the ability to shun system
failures and help minimize continual disruption to the community‘s everyday life
(CARRI, 2009). These characteristics remain essential for a full and swift
economic recovery. In theory, communities and individuals who have support
systems will experience less stress and recover more quickly from environmental
stressors than unsupported communities and individuals (VanBreda, 2001).
Henderson & Associates (1997) formulated a resiliency-training program,
which led to The Resiliency Wheel framework. The framework suggests six
characteristics that help individuals become resilient. The components of the
resiliency wheel are applicable to the Mississippi Gulf Coast and other resilient
communities. The Resiliency Training Program provides explanations of
characteristics of the framework (Henderson et al., 1997).
Increase pro-social bonding. Pro-social bonding involves strengthening
connections between the individual and any pro-social person or activity. This
concept provides individuals with a sense of purpose and connection in a
situation to cope with adversity. The mission of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
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expresses advancement in human progress through an economic, political and
social system based on individual freedom, incentive, initiative, opportunity and
responsibility (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 2009). In the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina, the Hancock County Chamber of Commerce shared that mission in
taking initiative, seeking opportunities, and accepting responsibilities as a unified
leader in recovery efforts and prosocial bonding. Networking became evident as
local businesses, civic leaders, volunteer organizations and the citizens of
Hancock County united to support the chamber‘s mission statement (Hancock
County Chamber of Commerce, 2009).

Set and
Communicate
High
Expectations

Increase
Pro-social
Bonding

Set Clear &
Consistent
Boundaries

Provide
Caring and
Support
Provide
Opportunities
for Meaningful
Participation
Teach Life
Skills

Figure 2.1 The Resiliency Wheel. The wheel illustrates six consistent
themes or characteristics of communities that foster resiliency.
Adapted from ―The Resiliency Training Program‖, by Nan Henderson and
Associates, 1997.
Set clear, consistent boundaries. Clear, consistent boundaries
communicate expectations and enforce consistent boundaries. Resilient
communities should balance between addressing concerns and getting back to a
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normal schedule. Katrina damaged 134,000 homes in the state of Mississippi,
including 65,000 residences completely destroyed (Penick & Riley, 2006).
Twelve percent of the population of Hancock, Harrison and Jackson Counties
lived in either catastrophic or extensive damage areas (Richard, 2005). In April
2006, The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) initiated the
Mississippi Housing Assistance Program as a Community Development Block
Grant. The program, administered through the Mississippi Development
Authority, dispersed funds in phases. The first phase provided financial
assistance to those homeowners outside the floodplain whose homeowner‘s
insurance did not cover structural flood damage. The second phase, initiated in
December 2006, serviced strictly low and moderate income applicants with
residences in or outside the pre-Katrina federal flood zones (MDA, 2009). The
phase included an economic development feature. The economic development
feature was responsible for ―helping local governments attract and retain new
jobs by restoring infrastructure and revitalizing downtown areas destroyed by the
hurricane‖ (Barbour, 2006, n. p.). The Housing Assistance Program addressed
the coast‘s housing issues, with clear regulation and administrative guidelines for
dispersement of funds.
Teach life-skills. Teaching and reinforcing life skills to individuals facing
adversity help residents successfully navigate through the disaster experience.
Life skills include conflict resolution, communication skills, problem solving,
decision-making and healthy stress management. Mississippi residents received
support after Hurricane Katrina. The University of Pennsylvania School of Social
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Policy and Practice, in conjunction with Bucks Mont Katrina Relief Project
committed to a long-term partnership to provide volunteers, needs assessments,
mental health planning and intervention and health fairs in Hancock County
(Scurfield, 2008). This partnership offered social support needed by Mississippi
residents.
Provide caring and support. Caring and support serve as the most crucial
of all elements promoting resiliency. Research indicates the impossibilities of
successfully overcoming adversity without the presence of trusting, supportive
relationships. In the aftermath of Katrina, voluntary outpouring of outside
assistance in the forms of time, effort, money and services emerged (Scurfield,
2008). For example, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill sent a
physician, several volunteer students and nurses to the Gulf Coast to provide
healthcare to patients at three different clinics for five full days. Likewise,
volunteer students set up a makeshift clinic, and aided Habitat for Humanity with
home repairs and with clean up (Biloxi/Hurricane Katrina Trip, 2008).
Organizations and volunteers from all over the world supported Mississippi
residents and business communities for months following the disaster.
Provide opportunities for meaningful participation. Opportunities for
meaningful participation involves giving individuals responsibility for activities in
their community by providing opportunities to solve problems, make decisions,
plan, set goals and help others. Residents feel part of the solution when
provided the opportunity to develop ways to address the crisis and aid in the
recovery. ―A resilient community recognizes that private businesses, individual
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citizens and volunteer organizations and associations are critical aspects of the
fabric of a community and play significant roles in community resilience‖
(Edwards, 2007, n. p.). ―By depending on the contributions of its members,
communities promote creativity, productivity, gifts and participation of people‖
(VanBreda, 2001, p. 156). When communities are recovering from a crisis, both
formal support systems (state and federal organizations) and informal support
systems (associations, local organizations, citizens) serve as essential aspects of
recovery (McKnight, 1997).
Set and communicate high expectations. In recovering from adversity,
communities must set and communicate high expectations. In order to be an
effective motivator, expectations must be realistic. In the case of Hurricane
Katrina, Mississippi residents set high expectations for recovery based on past
experiences. The Flood of 1927 cost the state of Mississippi $350 million in
damages (―Exploring Earth‖, 2008), while Hurricane Camille in 1969 costs $4.2
billion in 1969 dollars (Grammatico, 2009). Successful recovery from past
disastrous events allowed Katrina survivors to believe that recovery was realistic
and achievable (Edwards, 2007). The Mississippi coast communities reflect the
attitude promoted in the resilience literature: the kind of resilience that promotes
the ability to ―bounce back‖ (Schwartz, 1997, n. p.).
The Hancock County Community Development Foundation (HCCDF)
assists Hancock County communities with disaster recovery. In the aftermath of
Katrina, formation of the Hancock County Long-Term Recovery Committee
aimed at restoring the quality of life to citizens of Hancock County. These two
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organizations merged to provide effective coordination of resources. The newly
formed foundation‘s mission statement communicated high expectations. The
mission of HCCDF asserts providing programs and support for the recovery of
Hancock County, to support the educational and community programs of
Hancock County that stimulate job creation, to foster small business growth and
support workforce development and to support the long-term needs of
community non-governmental organizations (Hancock County Chamber of
Commerce, 2009). This foundation, like many other local organizations,
communicated the expectation for recovery and put in place support systems to
make recovery possible.
There are numerous stories of survival and enrichment on the Mississippi
Gulf Coast. The coast possesses many factors of Henderson‘s resiliency wheel
and these support systems aided in the ongoing recovery and rebuilding postHurricane Katrina. Local citizens, private businesses and volunteer organizations
played significant roles in the recovery process. The social support systems
present in the Mississippi Gulf Coast remain critical aspects of the fabric of this
resilient community (Edwards, 2007).
Local governments played a significant role in helping small business
owners survive and reestablish post-hurricane. Owners experienced an increase
in new funding sources available to aid in re-opening their businesses (MDA,
2009). For example, the Mississippi Development Authority (2009) established
job generation funding offering loans to assist with marketing plans for small
businesses. This funding supports the establishment of businesses in Hancock
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County and offers support systems for resiliency. Scurfield (2008) states, ―there
is a human connecting between our local residents, neighbor-to neighbor, that
continues and is truly heartwarming, pervading many local families and
communities. Beyond individual resilience, community resilience truly is evident
in south Mississippi‖ (p. 15).
History of Resiliency on the Mississippi Gulf Coast
The Mississippi Gulf Coast refers to the three Mississippi counties which
lie on the Gulf of Mexico: Hancock, Harrison and Jackson counties. In 1699,
Sieur d‘Iberville first settled in an area currently known as Ocean Springs, MS.
The coast evolved over the last several centuries, but with each change cultural
and heritage enrichment emerged (HCTC, 2009). The antebellum homes along
Hwy. 90, which resembled the traces of French and Spanish rule, made the
coast well known. The many museums that share the art and history of the area
also bring tourist to the Coast. Beauvoir, the last home of Confederate President
Jefferson Davis, Fort Maurepas, Old Spanish Fort and Museum and St.
Augustine Church and Seminary (the state‘s oldest seminary training AfricanAmerican Roman Catholics for the priesthood) are just a few of the special
places to visit on the coast of Mississippi.
Unfortunately, several natural disasters, which have altered the area‘s
infrastructure, culture and history forever, make Mississippi well known. The year
of 1927 remains one of the worst years the Mississippi Valley ever experienced.
In early 1927, several months of unusually heavy rain caused the levee system
at Mounds Landing, MS to breech resulting in thirty feet of water covering towns
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up to 60 miles away (Ambrose & Brinkley, 2001). ―In the end, the Flood of 1927
affected an area of 27,000 square miles and caused $350 million in damages,
equivalent to approximately $5 billion today‖ (―Exploring Earth‖, 2008, n. p.).
In 1969, Hurricane Camille, classified as the strongest storm to ever enter
the United States Mainland, made landfall at the mouth of the Mississippi River
(National Hurricane Center, 2009). As a Category 5 Hurricane, Camille‘s wind
gusts reached 200 mph with a 25-foot storm surge and in only three hours
completely vanquished parts of the Mississippi Gulf Coast (National Hurricane
Center, 2009). Over 15,000 residents were homeless. The total damage caused
by Hurricane Camille was approximately $4.2 billion in 1969 dollars
(Grammatico, 2003).
Thirty-four years later, the Mississippi Gulf Coast again experienced a
natural disaster that completely annihilated sections of the coastland. Hurricane
Katrina, known as one of the costliest hurricanes, remains one of the five
deadliest storms in the history of the United States (Dass-Brailsford, 2008). Its
landfall introduced great calamity and Mississippi continues to recover (Phillips et
al., 2006). Based on the coasts‘ ability to recover from natural disasters in the
past, the community has the ability to remain resilient in spite of the community,
family and economic hardship (Bower, 2006). However, small businesses
continue to face variables that make recovery difficult (Runyan, 2006).
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Barriers to Recovery
Runyan (2006) identifies barriers to recovery that Mississippi businesses
faced after Hurricane Katrina: serious infrastructure problems, problems caused
by federal assistance agencies, vulnerability to cash flow and lack of access to
capital for recovery. Problems caused by infrastructure damage and difficulty
business owners faced due to federal assistance agencies extend beyond the
business owners control.
Serious Infrastructure Problems Impeding Recovery
Natural disasters often cause damage and destruction to infrastructure in
the community it affects. Infrastructure refers to the basic facilities, services, and
installation required of an economy to function (First Generation Consulting,
2005) such as, destruction of roadways, water and sewer systems or damage to
bridges and buildings. Small business owners faced serious infrastructure
problems after Hurricane Katrina and many, even with money available, had no
place to occupy to operate a business. Without adequate infrastructure,
business owners could not reopen. In Biloxi, Mississippi, almost complete
destruction occurred to most buildings and many roadways. In Pascagoula,
Mississippi, the buildings were intact but completely destroyed inside by flooding.
In Picayune, Mississippi and Covington, Louisiana, approximately 25% of
buildings experienced wind and rain damage (Runyan, 2006). Hancock County,
(Waveland, Kiln and Bay St. Louis) experienced complete destruction and most
businesses lost everything (K. Jett, personal communication, February 2, 2009).
The county endured extensive damage to roadways and bridges. Infrastructure
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damage was beyond human control; however; Mississippi communities also
faced man made barriers during Hurricane Katrina.
Problems Caused by Federal Assistance Agencies
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) serves under the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). ―The primary mission of the
Federal Emergency Management Agency is to reduce the loss of life and
property and protect the Nation from all hazards, including natural disasters, acts
of terrorism, and other man-made disasters, by leading and supporting the nation
in a risk-based, comprehensive emergency management system of
preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation‖ (FEMA, 2002, n.
p.). FEMA holds a large responsibility in the response and recovery phases when
a natural disaster occurs. However, apart from the storm damage itself, in most
cases the major source of problems in disasters surface from responding
organizations (Dynes, 1974). A recurring theme within Hurricane Katrina
recovery literature includes problems caused by the Federal Emergency
Management Agency. Post-Katrina FEMA offered substantial amounts of aid in
the form of living, food and housing allowances for those individuals affected by
the hurricane. Potential employees received a larger amount of monetary
assistance from FEMA than that of a standard paycheck. The large amounts of
assistance made it difficult for employers to recruit and hire employees (Runyan,
2006).
Because business owners could not prepare for infrastructure damage
and problems caused by FEMA, this study focuses on Runyan‘s (2006) financial
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variables: vulnerability to cash flow and lack of access to capital for recovery.
The proposed research utilizes Runyan‘s barriers and explores strategies used
by ―recovered‖ small business owners to overcome the financial barriers and
recover from Katrina.
Vulnerability to cash flow. Many small business owners operate with the
goal of providing a steady family income stream rather than a goal of long-term
growth (Carland et al., 1984). Owners operate on the cash flow generated by
day-to-day operations; thus, cash flow remains critical to a small business owner.
Any interruption in the flow could be professionally and personally devastating. ―A
delay of one to three weeks of an insurance claim settlement makes a difference‖
(Childs, 2008, p. 126). With closed businesses after Hurricane Katrina many
small business owners had no monetary means to continue operation and
became vulnerable to the lack of cash flow. However, cash flow represents only
one variable identified as a barrier. Lack of access to capital also proves to be a
serious impediment to recovery.
Lack of access to capital for recovery. Many small business owners
operate the business with the goal of providing a stable income for the family
(Carland et al., 1984). ―Thus, a major crisis such as Katrina will interrupt cash
flow for lengths of time which are devastating to such businesses" (Runyan,
2006, p. 19). Due to the lack of access to cash flow for recovery, those business
owners who did not have personal savings available became dependent upon
insurance companies for recovery capital. Hurricane Katrina induced an
unprecedented insurance crisis along the Mississippi and Louisiana Gulf Coast.
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Many business owners carried insurance policies, but few acquired flood
insurance unless previously mandated. Insurance companies used this as a
loophole and debated whether wind or water caused Katrina‘s destruction
(Braley, 2007). If the insurance companies that held homeowners policies could
establish the damage as flood related, responsibility could inevitably shift to flood
policies. Thousands of businesses remained stagnated as insurance companies
debated with lawyers to determine responsible parties. Meanwhile, business
owners lacked capital for business re-establishment. Owners relied on insurance
policies to obtain monies to rebuild. Without capital for recovery, many small
businesses waited for decisions, which would determine if the business could
ever reopen.
Vulnerability to cash flow and lack of access to capital for recovery remain
barriers, which ―recovering‖ small business owners have to overcome. These
barriers hinder rapid recovery; therefore, researchers and practitioners must find
recovery strategies to decrease recovery time. Fink (1986) suggests effective
crisis management can and does shorten the recovery phase. Crisis planning
and crisis management serve as organizational tools that can assist businesses
in preparing more effectively for response and recovery phases of a crisis. Better
preparation will inevitably produce better management techniques during a crisis.
Improved management techniques will equip small business owners with the
tools to overcome the variables that hinder recovery.
Additionally, business owners perceived the Small Business
Administration (SBA) as a hindrance to recovery. Businesses were able to
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borrow from the SBA to fund repairs or replacement of real estate, machinery
and equipment, inventory, and other assets not covered by insurance (Childs,
2008). SBA offered loans to small businesses affected by Katrina; however, the
process proved lengthy and a significant amount of time existed between the
application stage and funding (Runyan, 2006). Further complicating the process,
many small businesses did not back up critical tax records (Childs, 2008). SBA
requires pertinent tax information to determine eligibility for funds. With most of
the records destroyed, small business owners requested income transcripts from
the Internal Revenue Services. With thousands of small business owners
making similar requests simultaneously, the response did not come immediately.
Costly delays were inevitable (Childs, 2008). Very few businesses received any
funding within three months of the hurricane. For a large corporation, three
months has minimal impact on leadership; however, for a small business, three
months without income can be detrimental to the business and the owner‘s family
(Runyan, 2006). Research suggests for major improvements in disaster planning
and crisis management to occur, changes must occur within the standard
processes of relevant emergency organizations (Dynes, Quarantelli & Kreps,
1981).
Vulnerability to cash flow and lack of access to capital for recovery were
two of the biggest financial impediments to recovery that small business owners
faced after Hurricane Katrina (Runyan, 2006). Many businesses could not
sustain themselves through the financial hardships and therefore, did not
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recover. Alesch et al. (2001) implies why some businesses can withstand the
recovery process and others cannot.
Implications for Recovery
Theoretical Framework

Small businesses account for more than 50% of jobs in the U.S. today;
Crisis Planning

(Alesch et al., 2001) however, when hit by natural disasters many cannot survive
and discontinue business. The loss of a small business deeply affects the
community in which it resides. A Bureau of Labor Statistics‘ 1996 report
predicted small business sectors would contribute about 60% of new jobs by
2005 (Posner, 1998). Economic impacts remain widespread. Even small firms
play huge roles in the economic growth of the area they occupy (SBA, 2009).
Since the 1996 report, increased recognition of the importance of small
businesses emerged. Researchers find it increasingly important to determine
factors that enable small businesses to survive and recover from high magnitude
natural disasters. In 2001, the University of Wisconsin-Green Bay conducted the
Small Organizations Natural Hazard Project (Alesch et al., 2001). The projects‘
objective included discovering why some small businesses and not-for-profit
organizations survive natural disasters and why others do not. Researchers
used a mixed methods research design to draw inferences about the distinctions
between small businesses who survived and those who did not (Alesch et al.,
2001). Qualitative interviews uncovered data highlighting five key variables that
enabled businesses to survive. The first two variables critical to organizational
survival deal with robustness and the remaining variables deal with resiliency
issues.
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According to Alesch et al. (2001), ―robustness is the capacity or ability of a
system to withstand shocks to it emanating from its environment‖ (p. 16). The
first critical variable pertains to the extent to which the business lost production or
service capacity, inventory, and capital assets as a consequence of the
hazardous event. If a small business cannot offer normal services due to loss,
business re-establishment is unlikely. The second variable critical to business
recovery involves the extent of adverse affects experienced by the businesses‘
customers or clientele. ―If a very large proportion of the firm‘s customers suffer
significant losses, then sales will suffer, often significantly‖ (Alesch et al., 2001, p.
20). If the customer base experiences a decrease in discretionary monies, the
businesses receiving the money will experience a decrease. However,
businesses that offer essential services (those that are necessities), will
experience a substantial increase following the disaster. Alesch et al. (2001)
suggests robustness of a firm increases when servicing customers throughout a
widely dispersed area, reducing the likelihood of simultaneously affecting all
customers. However, some small business owners lack the feasibility to spread
the business coverage area.
The remaining three variables involve organizational resiliency.
Businesses unable to resume operations immediately following a disaster suffer
substantially. Research shows little customer loyalty to individual small
businesses exists (Alesch et al., 2001). Therefore, where customers require
services or products small business cannot immediately supply, business
resiliency diminishes (Childs, 2008). ―The longer a business is unable to supply
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its previous customers with services, the less likely the business will survive‖
(Alesch et al., 2001, p. 21). The second resiliency variable involves the small
businesses‘ financial strength prior to the disaster. ―Firms that are stronger going
into the disaster seem to be better able to attain post-event viability‖ (Alesch et
al., 2001, p. 21). Lastly, the third variable involves the small business owners‘
ability to adapt. Business owners must recognize and adapt to the post-event
market for goods and services. Businesses experience drastic and irrevocable
environmental changes after a disaster such as Hurricane Katrina. Businesses
that survive do not attempt to use pre-event practices after the event.
Alesch et al. (2001) concludes that most small business owners hold few
ideas about how to recover. The research suggests that smaller, financially
weaker businesses and those under significant stress before the event typically
do not survive the disastrous event (Alesch et al., 2001). However, even with the
best preparation and recovery plans, a natural disaster the magnitude of
Hurricane Katrina will have adverse impacts on affected communities.
Katrina‘s Impact on Mississippi Gulf Coast
In the history of the United States, Hurricane Katrina classifies as the most
expensive hurricane to ravish the Gulf Coast (Dass-Brailsford, 2008). Hurricane
Katrina accounted for over $80 billion in damages--the highest loss ever
recorded from a single storm (U.S. Dept. of Transportation, 2006). The storm
spanned approximately 250 miles of the United States (―Property Claim‖, 2006).
With a storm surge of 29 feet in some areas, Mississippi officials calculate that
90% of the structures within half a mile of the coastline were completely
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destroyed (―Mississippi Coast‖, 2005) with railroad tracks serving as a barrier to
the storm surge (FEMA, 2004). Katrina affected various entities of the
Mississippi economy including housing, large and small business communities
and the insurance industry.
Housing
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, housing affordability (i.e., the ability of
households to find standard housing at an affordable price) was a major problem
in the coastal housing market (McCarthy & Hanson, 2008). Particularly acute in
the rental market, 40% of the households were spending more than 30% of their
incomes before the storm on rent (McCarthy & Hanson, 2008). ―In the days after
Katrina made landfall, FEMA provided a series of GIS map layers outlining areas
on the Gulf Coast that were impacted at various levels‖ (Richard, 2005, p. 4).
The FEMA damage levels included: catastrophic, extensive, moderate, limited
and flood. Katrina damaged 134,000 homes in the state of Mississippi, including
65,000 completely destroyed (Penick & Riley, 2006). The three Gulf Coast
counties experiencing the most severe impacts of Katrina include Hancock,
Harrison and Jackson Counties (McCarthy & Hanson, 2008). Over 43,000
residents of Hancock, Harrison and Jackson Counties lived in either catastrophic
or extensive damage areas, representing approximately 12% of the population
(Richard, 2005). ―Approximately 37 percent of the total Mississippi population
lived somewhere in one of the five FEMA damaged areas‖ (McCarthy & Hanson,
2008, p. 39). In three coastal counties, approximately 22,000 severely damaged
units and another 10,000 sustained moderate damage (McCarthy & Hanson,
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2008). In Hancock County specifically, (Bay St. Louis, Waveland, Kiln,
Diamondhead and Pass Christian) approximately 90% of all occupied housing
units sustained damage (Phillips et al., 2006), with approximately 70% of the
occupied housing units suffering major or severe damage (FEMA, 2005).
Losses induced immediate need for housing for affected residents.
However, four months after Hurricane Katrina destroyed homes, thousands of
residents continued to live in tents constructed by the Navy Seabees while
awaiting FEMA trailers (Lipton, 2005b). In an attempt to keep cost down and
speed up reconstruction, Mississippi Governor Barbour created a housing council
to develop plans for affordable housing (Penick & Riley, 2006). The housing
council‘s approach relied heavily on modular housing. However, a report
entitled, A Year and a Half After Katrina and Rita, an Uneven Recovery,
suggests, ―housing rebuilding efforts have become mired in the morass that is
skyrocketing insurance premiums, minimal insurance payouts, FEMA elevation
standards, rising construction costs, and indecision on the part of residents about
how to move forward‖ (Rowley, 2007, pp. 4-5). Cost for securing adequate
housing proved difficult for many local residents. Increases in construction costs,
for example, lumber, plywood, engineers and construction workers resulted in
higher costs to acquire housing.
The hurricane adversely affected Hancock County‘s housing market
(McCarthy & Hanson, 2008). According to the Hancock County‘s Bay St. Louis
Comprehensive Plan (2008), approximately 60% of uninhabitable homes in Bay
St. Louis existed; thus, residents within these areas temporarily and in some
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cases, permanently relocated. As residents left the area, the population of
Hancock County decreased by 24% between July 2005 and January 2006
(Hancock County Chamber of Commerce, 2008). However, since the 2006 low,
population continues to increase within the county. ―Building permit data from
the Hancock County Building Office indicates that there are a significant number
of new homes that were built and are being built in the northern portions of
Hancock County and in Diamondhead‖ (Hancock County Chamber of
Commerce, 2008, p. 105).
Overall, lack of affordable housing remains a challenge, according to a
2008 study by the Biloxi-based Mississippi Center for Justice (Jervis, 2008).
Likewise, Hurricane Katrina contributed to commercial damages. The storm
affected local, small businesses on the Gulf Coast.
Small Businesses
Most research on crisis recovery centers on larger communities and
businesses (Hale et al., 2005; Quarantelli, 1988). However, no business remains
immune from natural disasters and small businesses with limited resources are
especially vulnerable to the catastrophic consequences of crisis events (Spillan &
Hough, 2003). The literature on disaster recovery generally suggests that many
small businesses and not-for-profit organizations do not recover from major
disasters (Waugh et al., 2006). A significant variable that opens small businesses
to vulnerability includes fewer financial resources and less access to capital to
plan, respond and recover (Kirchhoff, 1994). Childs (2008) suggests that only
29% of small businesses continue to operate two years after a natural disaster.
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The Hartford Financial Group (2002) reports 43% of small business owners with
no emergency plan will never reopen. Many businesses without insurance or
with inadequate insurance coverage do not recover, as small businesses tend to
be underinsured (Waugh et al., 2006).
For the small business community, Hurricane Katrina presented a
recovery process obstacle that some could not overcome (Waugh et al., 2006).
Hurricane Katrina damaged or destroyed more than 125,000 small and midsize
businesses in the Gulf Coast Region (Loten, 2006). Many reopened and
struggled for months before failing (Waugh et al., 2006). Disasters cause new
economic environments. Small business owners must possess the ability to
adapt to the new environment (Alesch et al., 2001). Yet, small business districts
still struggle to recruit new businesses to fill empty storefronts (Waugh et al.,
2006).
Over 15% of the businesses were in FEMA‘s catastrophic zone. Every two
out of five businesses were located in one of the FEMA damage zones (Richard,
2005). According to Penick & Riley (2006), casinos served as a major employer
and revenue source in the state. ―Katrina wiped out nine of the ten casinos in
Biloxi, with the surviving one severely damaged‖ (Penick & Riley, 2006, n. p.).
The manufacturing industry, a large employer on the Gulf Coast, did not
experience destruction. ―Only about 10% of total manufacturing employment in
the three counties was in any of the FEMA damage zones‖ (Richard, 2005, p. 8).
Business sectors represented more extensively in the damaged areas include
financial, services and retail (FEMA, 2005).
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The retail sector, a large employer on the coast, felt the brunt of Katrina‘s
damage (FEMA, 2005). Research indicates retail businesses are less likely to
recover after a natural disaster (Waugh et al., 2006). The Mississippi State Tax
Commission (MSTC) (2005) released data reflecting the destruction in the retail
sector. The data indicate the difference in sales tax collections between 2004
and 2005. The top three cities with negative losses include Waveland,
Mississippi (-85%), Pass Christian, MS (-77%) and Bay St. Louis, MS (-40%), all
of which fall within Hancock County; thus suggesting the retail industry in
Hancock County received the greatest impacts (MSTC, 2005). Over half of the
Hancock County businesses sustained damage (Hancock County Chamber of
Commerce, 2009). As businesses closed residents became unemployed.
According to the Mississippi Recovery Fact Sheet (2008), unemployment rates
for Hancock County in August 2005 before Katrina made landfall totaled 5.9%.
One-month later unemployment rates reached 22%. By May 2008,
unemployment rates decreased to 5.5%, lower than pre-Katrina percentages.
Researchers contribute the decrease to the national recession, which began in
late 2008 (U.S. Dept. of Labor, 2009). However, the end of 2009 reports a
decrease in unemployment rates in Hancock County. Re-establishment of the
area casinos aided greatly in this improvement (Moore et al., 2007).
Streamlining the recovery process and getting businesses reopened
following a disaster remains a critical need (Alesch et al., 2001; CARRI, 2008).
Research provides evidence that finances continue as a major obstacle for small
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business owners (Alesch et al., 2001; Childs, 2008; Runyan, 2006). Many
business owners rely on insurance to provide finances for recovery.
Insurance Crisis
Since Hurricane Katrina, the Gulf Coast of Mississippi faces an insurance
crisis resulting in increasing premiums and uninsured residents (Braley, 2007).
The insurance industry labeled Hurricane Katrina the most expensive loss in U.S.
history including not just cost of losses but also the cost in adjusting those losses
(Witty, 2005). In 2005, homeowner insurance companies paid out $7.3 billion in
claims, which is more than taken in from policyholder premiums (Adams, 2006).
Hurricanes and other disasters involving flooding create insurance
coverage issues not present with other natural disasters. Property and
homeowner‘s insurance seldom offer coverage for flood damage (Braley, 2007;
King, 2005). Large amounts of homes damaged were outside of the federally
specified flood zone. Most homeowners within these zones did not hold flood
insurance; hence, their regular policies excluded flooding (Braley, 2007). ―Less
than 20 percent of all the single-family property owners throughout Harrison and
Hancock appear to have had flood insurance‖ (McCarthy & Hanson, 2008, p. 73).
Large numbers of claims caused insurance companies to debate whether wind
effects or flood effects caused property damage. ―If individual companies can
prove water caused the destruction to property instead of wind, and the
policyholder has federal flood coverage, then the National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP) pays the bill‖ (Braley, 2007, p. 3). The federal program, NFIP
offers flood coverage to U.S. citizens not covered by another policy (Poling,
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2006). Figures released in 2006 report almost $2.4 billion paid on almost 20,000
claims in Mississippi alone through NFIP compared to State Farm‘s $1 billion on
almost 80,000 claims (Lee, 2006).
As of August 2006, the insurance industry reports settling 95% of
Hurricane Katrina claims by paying more than 993,000 homeowners $15.5 billion
in settlements (Regional Business News, 2005). However, the big payouts have
caused repercussions. The insurance sector contributes to the rise of housing
costs in the market as companies attempt to reduce exposure by increasing rates
(Hedde, 2007). Coastal areas of Mississippi and Louisiana experienced
insurance rate increases around 500% (New Orleans City Business, 2006).
Residential and commercial insurance costs escalated drastically since Katrina
and the costs hinder the rebuilding process. Many insurance companies no
longer write insurance coverage for coastal areas of the United States (Phillips,
Collins, & Fielder, 2007). In 2007, State Farm insurance announced they would
no longer write new business in the State of Mississippi. The net effect raises
business recovery costs (Johnson, 2007).
With recovery time and costs increasing, Childs (2008) suggests small
business owners protect themselves against interruption in business revenues.
A carefully crafted insurance program can protect businesses from unanticipated
losses, such as the temporary disruption in cash flow. Frequently, loss of income,
not property (often insured) causes small business owners to file for bankruptcy
following a disaster (Childs, 2008). Business interruption insurance pays the
owner anticipated earnings based on uninterrupted business operations (Childs,
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2008). Business interruption insurance can potentially keep many small
businesses open.
Hancock County‘s Bay St. Louis Comprehensive Plan (2008) predicted,
―the time of the recovery of Hancock County after Hurricane Katrina
will be dependent on the government‘s ability to meet the
challenges imposed by rising insurance costs and a limited
insurance market, and by the new advisory base flood elevations
that call for increasing the finished first floor elevations of homes
across the Hancock County coastline‖ (p. 105). Continuous
economic recovery remains vital to the success of the region
(Hancock County Chamber of Commerce, 2008).
Summary
Chapter II included an exploration of the theoretical framework foundation
of this study. The chapter explored the theoretical underpinnings of crisis
planning, crisis management and resiliency. The researcher described the
history of resiliency on the Mississippi Gulf Coast, including a discussion of
previous natural disasters experienced on the coast. Hurricane Katrina presented
many challenges to affected Gulf Coast communities (Scurfield, 2008). Chapter
II explored the impact that Hurricane Katrina had on various sectors of
Mississippi‘s economy. The chapter examined negative impacts experienced by
the housing, business and insurance sectors. Research acknowledges
interrelationships among recovery for housing, employment, insurance and
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business sectors and requires increased coordination and planning in recovery
efforts (McCarthy & Hanson, 2008).
Chapter III presents an overview of the mixed methods research design
and establishes its appropriateness for this research. The research design
outlines the procedures followed in order to meet the objectives of the study.
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CHAPTER III
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Since August 2005, the Mississippi Gulf Coast small business community
faces the overwhelming challenge of recovering from the Hurricane Katrina
disaster. Although the Gulf Coast Region experienced several storms over the
last several decades, the recovery process remains tedious (K. Jett, personal
communication, February 2, 2009). Runyan (2006) identifies four barriers to
recovery that hinder small business owners on the Mississippi Gulf Coast:
problems caused by serious infrastructure damage, problems caused by federal
assistance agencies, vulnerability to cash flow and lack of access to capital for
recovery. Business owners cannot prepare for or control damages to
infrastructure or problems caused by federal assistance agencies. Therefore, this
research only considers Runyan‘s financial barriers (vulnerability to cash flow
and lack of access to capital for recovery), which owners can prepare for predisaster. Limited research exists focusing specifically on determining how
business owners surviving natural disasters overcome these barriers. This gap in
the literature creates a need for research-based knowledge of strategies that
encourage recovery from specified barriers after a natural disaster. More
practically, the need exists for small business owners to gain knowledge
regarding preparation to overcome such barriers.
The purpose of this study is to determine how ―recovered‖ small business
owners in Mississippi overcame financial barriers to recovery after Hurricane
Katrina. This study discusses the process of recovery from the business owners‘

58
perspective and examines the strategies undertaken by small business owners in
Hancock County to overcome financial barriers to recovery pre-and-postHurricane Katrina. Hancock County is the small community, approximately
40,000 inhabitants, located at the western end of the coast. The county suffered
the worst overall damages from Hurricane Katrina (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009).
In order to examine the recovery strategies undertaken by small business
owners, the following research objectives (RO) are explored:
RO-1: Determine strategies ―recovered‖ small business owners in
Hancock County, Mississippi implemented during Hurricane Katrina
recovery relative to:
v1. lack of access to capital for recovery post-Hurricane Katrina.
V2.

vulnerability to cash flow post-Hurricane Katrina.

RO-2: Identify strategies ―recovered‖ small business owners in Hancock
County, Mississippi, implemented pre-Hurricane Katrina in
preparation for future disasters.
RO-3: Identify strategies ―recovered‖ small business owners in Hancock
County, Mississippi, implemented post-Hurricane Katrina in
preparation for future disasters.
RO-4: Identify characteristics of a resilient small business owner as
perceived by ―recovered‖ small business owners in Hancock
County, Mississippi.
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Design of the Study
This section explains the appropriateness of mixed methods research
design for this study. The last several decades presented an increasing interest
and debate concerning the pros and cons of qualitative and quantitative
research. Experts ponder which method reigns as the superior approach
(Creswell, 2003; Newman & Benz, 1998). Denzin and Lincoln (1994) offer a
definition of qualitative research: qualitative research is multi-method in focus,
involving an interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject matter. The objective
of qualitative research seeks depth rather than breadth; focusing on smaller
samples; learning about how and why people behave and think the way they do;
and discovering rather than verifying theory or process (Ambert, Adler, Adler, &
Detzner, 1995). Qualitative research produces findings in non-statistical or
otherwise quantifiable means (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Quantitative research
serves as ―a means for testing objective theories by examining the relationship
among variables. Variables, in turn, can be measured typically with instruments
so that numbered data can be analyzed using statistical procedures‖ (Creswell,
2009, p. 4). Quantitative research enables researchers to gain insight into
relationships among concepts and theories (Filstead, 1979). Researchers gain
insight by the translation of observations into numbers using counting and
measuring techniques (Filstead, 1979; Hines, 1993). Various outlets now exist for
discussions regarding mixed methods research design including journal articles
and books (Creswell, 2003; Houtz, 1995; Janz et al., 1996; Lysack & Krefting,
1994).
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Determining research methodology depends upon several factors
including, the study‘s objectives, the type of research questions asked, and the
data analysis techniques used (Newman & Benz, 1998). When analyzing such
factors, both quantitative and qualitative methods apply. Researchers suggest
mixing the two approaches maximizes the strengths of both methodologies
(Newman & Benz, 1998). In the 1970s, researchers began to mix qualitative and
quantitative methods in field methods such as observations and interviews
combined with surveys (Sieber, 1973). In an attempt to seek convergence
across both methods Jick (1979) felt that biases inherent to each approach could
be neutralized by triangulating data sources (Creswell, 2003). ―From the original
concept of triangulation emerged additional reasons for mixing different types of
data‖ (Creswell, 2003, p. 15); thus developing the mixed methods approach. The
mixed methods research design to inquiry combines or associates both
qualitative and quantitative forms. Mixed methods include more than simply
collecting and analyzing both kinds of data. It involves the use of both
approaches in tandem so that the overall strength of the study exceeds either
qualitative or quantitative research alone (Creswell, 2003). Several published
studies merge qualitative and quantitative methods.
In 1959, Campbell and Fiske used multiple methods to study validity of
psychological traits (Creswell, 2003). Through the years, many studies combine
quantitative and qualitative methodologies. The following studies illustrate this
concept. In 1987, a study entitled ―Monitoring High School Drinking Patterns &
Influences‖ utilizes focus group sessions and surveys to explore in-depth
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perceptions of alcohol consumption patterns and influences on consumption
among high school students (Beck, K., Hanson-Matthews, M., & Summons, T.,
1987). The study suggests qualitative research techniques, such as the individual
interviews, can serve as a valuable adjunct to quantitative survey techniques in
both the formative stages of program development and the summative stages of
program assessment (Beck, Matthews & Summons, 1987). Later, in 2004, a pilot
study entitled ―Spirituality and Coping Among Survivors of Prostate Cancer‖
explored the influence of religion and spirituality on coping among survivors of
prostate cancer. Thirty-eight men completed a self-administered survey and 29 of
the men participated in five focus group interviews (Bowie, Sydnor, Granot &
Pargament, 2004). More recently, Curtis, Rabren and Reilly (2009) from Auburn
University, conducted a study investigating the quality of life transition of former
students who received special education services while in high school. The
participants provided data for both the survey and focus group methodologies.
The study specifically uses the sequential explanatory mixed methods
research design. Collection and analysis of quantitative data occurs first, followed
by qualitative data collection and analysis (Creswell, 2003). Additionally, the
interpretation phase integrates data from both methods.
Creswell (2003) defines the sequential explanatory design as,
Characterized by the collection and analysis of quantitative data
followed by the collection and analysis of qualitative data. The two
methods are integrated during the interpretation phase of the study.
The design is especially useful when unexpected results arise from
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a quantitative study (Morse, 1991). In this case, the qualitative data
collection that follows can be used to examine these surprising
results in more detail. The straightforward nature of this design is
one of its main strengths. The main weakness of this design is the
length of time involved in data collection, with the two separate
phases. (p. 215)
Evidence from previous studies suggests that interviews and survey
research combined can serve as an effective research methodology. Therefore,
in order to collect the broadest range of information possible and to confirm
findings from different data sources, this study utilizes the mixed methods
research design (Creswell, 2003). Each possessing strengths and weaknesses
(Yin, 1994), the multi-method approach allows for analysis of both quantitative
and qualitative responses. By using mixed methods research design, the study
encompasses the advantages of combining narrative and graphic descriptions
and presents the research in a more holistic manner (Newman & Benz, 1998).
Population and Sample
The population of this study consists of small business owners who are
members of The Old Town Bay St. Louis Merchants Association (OTBMA). The
association is a group of independent shop owners who have banded together to
cooperatively promote the Old Town Shopping District. The population sample
utilized is small business owners who are active members of OTBMA and
experienced and survived Hurricane Katrina.
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Institutional Review Board Approval (IRB)
Prior to contacting the population sample, the researcher submitted the
project to The University of Southern Mississippi Human Subjects Protection
Review Committee for approval. The committee review process ensures projects
involving human subjects follow federal regulations. Participation in this project
was voluntary, and participants had the option to withdraw from this study at any
time without penalty, prejudice, or loss of benefits according to guidelines set
forth by the review committee. Approval was obtained from the IRB as seen in
Appendix C.
Unit of Sampling
In addressing the primary purpose of the study, the researcher utilized a
purposeful sample of small business owners from Hancock County including,
Bay St. Louis, Pass Christian, Kiln and Waveland, Mississippi. A purposeful
sample was used to obtain information rich data (Creswell, 2003). Patton (2002)
notes, ―the power of purposeful sampling lie in the selection of information rich
cases from which one can learn a great deal about matters of importance and
therefore worthy of in-depth study‖ (p. 242). Hancock County business owners
are appropriate for this study given each faced the same disastrous event that
destroyed the majority of the Hancock County community. Each owner can
provide data to accomplish the study‘s four-research objective.
The researcher received a verbal agreement of support from OTBMA
and the Hancock County Chamber of Commerce to serve as participants in this
research project. Forty members of the OTBMA served as the population
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sample for this study. The OTBMA comprised of independent, small business,
shop owners, banded together to cooperatively promote the Old Town Shopping
District in Hancock County (N. Moynan, personal communication, February 2,
2009). The group, formally a conjunction of businesses from the Old Town and
Depot districts, touts a mission to move the small business district of Bay St.
Louis toward recovery. Members of OTBMA were chosen because membership
represents a population with interest in investigating recovery strategies utilized
after Hurricane Katrina.
Selection Criteria
Participation in the research was voluntary. Participation required
business owners meet all of the following criteria: a) small business owner with
membership in OTBMA; b) business address within Hancock County,
Mississippi; c) business which was in operation prior to Hurricane Katrina; d)
business currently open, and e) owner availability and voluntary agreement to
participate.
Data Collection and Instrumentation
The researcher collected and analyzed both quantitative and qualitative
data. Although the quantitative data (survey) collection occurred first, qualitative
results built upon interpretations of the quantitative results, thus presenting a
more detailed picture of the disaster recovery. In-depth interviews serve as the
primary source of data (Creswell, 2003) utilized to address the research
objectives and purpose of the study. RO-1 determines strategies ―recovered‖
small business owners in Hancock County, Mississippi implemented during
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Hurricane Katrina recovery relative to financial barriers to recovery. RO-2 and
RO-3 explore strategies ―recovered‖ small business owners in Hancock County,
Mississippi, implemented pre and post-Hurricane Katrina in preparation for future
disasters. Lastly, RO-4 identifies characteristics of a resilient small business
owner as perceived by ―recovered‖ small business owners in Hancock County,
Mississippi.
During the study, the researcher made contact seven times with the
participants. To increase participation and ensure attainment of appropriate
information, the contacts occurred in the following chronological order:
1. The researcher attended OTBMA’s monthly meeting. OTBMA
holds monthly meetings for member business owners to discuss
community issues (Nancy Moynan, personal communication,
February 2, 2009). The researcher attended a meeting to introduce
the research and inform the business owners of the opportunity to
participate in the study. The participants had the option to complete
the survey during the meeting and return the survey to the
researcher that same night, submit the survey online via Survey
Monkey or complete and mail a hard copy via U.S. Postal Service
to the researcher. Business owners that completed the survey
during the monthly meeting were advised not to complete the
survey again when received via email. To ensure consistency in
data entry, the researcher entered all hard copy versions returned
into the online survey (Fleischer & Nickel, 1995).
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2. An introduction letter was disseminated at OTBMA’s monthly
meeting and e-mailed to all business members. The researcher
distributed an introduction letter to attending business owners at the
monthly meeting and the letter was later distributed via email by the
Bay-Waveland Mainstreet Association to members of the Old Town
Bay St. Louis Merchants Association. The introduction letter
included the purpose of the study, an explanation of benefits of the
study, how the results would be used and commitment
requirements. The letter also explained result confidentiality and
voluntary participation. This contact provided advance notice of the
opportunity to participate (Dillman, 2007).
3. The survey tool was distributed via email to the entire membership
(40 members) of OTBMA. The Bay-Waveland Mainstreet
Association sent the survey to all 40 members on the OTBMA
member distribution list. According to Dillman (2007), ―email
surveys are easier to compose and send‖ (p. 353) and include
nearly complete elimination of paper, postage and data entry costs.
4. A reminder email was disseminated to encourage non-respondents
to complete the survey. In an effort to increase participation, one
week after the initial survey transmission, an email reminder was
distributed to encourage non-respondents to complete the survey
(Dillman, 2007; Fowler, 2002).
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5. The entire survey was emailed a second time to remaining nonrespondents. Two weeks after the initial survey transmission, all
businesses received a second email of the entire survey with an
invitation to participate, excluding those that already submitted the
survey (Dillman, 2007).
6. The researcher contacted participants who indicated voluntary
agreement for focus group participation. The researcher contacted
participants to inform them of the scheduled interview session date.
Five participants agreed to partake in face-to-face interviews
instead of the originally planned focus groups. The original plan to
conduct focus groups was modified due to low response rates
received from surveys.
7. The researcher conducted face-to-face in-depth interviews. The
researcher met with each participant to conduct interview sessions.
This mixed methods study utilized survey research, in-depth interviews
and field notes to gain an initial understanding of the business owners‘ account of
lived experiences in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.
Survey
According to Rosenfeld, Edwards & Thomas (1995) a survey is ―a method
used to gather self-report descriptive information about the attitudes, behaviors,
or other characteristics of some population‖ (p. 548). Fink (2003) provides a
more recent definition as a ―system for collecting information from or about
people to describe, compare, or explain their knowledge, attitude, and behavior‖

68
(p. 1). The use of survey research dates back to the early 1800s; however, the
increased acceptance and use of surveys began in the 1930s. Advances in
technology, increased emphasis on cost and efficiency and changing societal
attitudes contributes to the increased use (Dillman, 2000). According to Bennett
(1991), survey research is cheaper, quicker and broader in coverage than other
methods. When assessing phenomena not directly observable, experts
recognize survey research as the most frequently used data collection method
(Gall et al., 2003; Schneider et al., 1996; Smith & Dainty, 1991).
The survey content for the present study is adapted from a selfadministered questionnaire entitled, ―Businesses and Disasters: Impacts and
Recovery Following Hurricane Andrew.‖ The University of Delaware‘s Disaster
Research Center (DRC) developed the ―Businesses and Disasters‖ survey and
utilized it in three prior research studies (University of Delaware, 2009). The
DRC was the first social science research center in the world devoted to the
study of disasters (University of Delaware, 2009). The center conducts field and
survey research on group, organization and community preparation for and
recovery from natural disasters. The researcher modified the ―Businesses and
Disasters‖ survey to fit the objectives of this study and to ensure gathering of
valid information. The developer of ―Businesses and Disasters‖ granted
permission for use of the tool in this study (see Appendix D). Survey Monkey, an
online survey tool, assisted the researcher in creating the survey and collecting
responses. Participants inputted responses into the Survey Monkey tool, which
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was organized into an Excel spreadsheet and the tool developed charts and
graphs of the results.
In order to accomplish RO-1 through RO-4, strategies implemented during
Katrina relative to financial barriers to recovery, strategies implemented pre-andpost Katrina in preparation for future disasters and characteristics of a resilient
small business owner, an online structured survey was disseminated via Survey
Monkey (Creswell, 2003; Morse 1991). Data collection occurred in Hancock
County, Mississippi.
Table 3.1
Survey Matrix (Q1-17)
Measure (Questions)

Demographic

Q1

Classification as a small business

Q2

Located in Hancock County

Q3

Operated before Katrina made landfall

Q4

Business is currently in operation

Q5-17 and 23

Demographical, financial and business damage
information (i.e. gender of owner, business
industry, number of years in business,
geographical market of customer base, number
of employees, and nature and extent of
damage)

The first four questions of the survey address the study‘s selection criteria,
which are: a) small business owner with membership in OTBMA; b) business
address within Hancock County, Mississippi; c) business was in operation prior to
Hurricane Katrina; d) business currently open, and e) owner availability and
voluntary agreement to participate. If the participant did not answer ―yes‖ to all of
the selection criteria, directions instructed the participant to discontinue the
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survey and submit it with only the first four questions answered. Questions 5Questions 17 and Question 23, enrich the study by offering descriptive,
quantitative support to the study. The questions request demographical
information (gender of owner, business industry, number of years in business,
geographical market of customer base, number of employees), financial
information (losses sustained in sales and revenue) and business damage
information (nature and extent of damage). Questions 5-Questions 17 and
Questions 23 are displayed in charts and tables as frequency counts.
Table 3.2
Survey Matrix (Q18-24)
Measure (Questions)

Objective

Q18 and Q21-22

Address RO-1, strategies implemented during
Katrina recovery relative to financial barriers to
recovery

Q19-20

Address RO-2, strategies implemented preKatrina in preparation for future disasters

Q24

Address RO-2 and RO-3 strategies
implemented pre-and-post Katrina in
preparation for future disasters and RO-4,
identify characteristics of a resilient small
business owner

Questions 18 and 21-22 address RO-1, strategies owners implemented
relative to financial barriers to recovery. The three questions explore how
business owners handled vulnerability to cash flow and lack of access to capital
after Katrina. Questions 19 and 20 address RO-2, strategies business owners
implemented pre-Katrina. Question 24 address RO-2 and RO-3, strategies
business owners‘ implemented pre-Katrina and post-Katrina. Question 24 also
addresses RO-4, identifying characteristics of a resilient small business owner. A
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final question at the end of the survey solicited participants for individual
interviews. Participants supplied contact information as volunteers for further
participation in individual interviews.
Originally, the study was designed to conduct two focus group sessions
with participants that volunteered via the survey tool. However, due to the low
response rate (11 usable surveys), the researcher modified the methodology to
ensure reliability of the study. The methodology changed from utilizing two focus
group sessions to conducting five individual, face-to-face in-depth interviews.
The five interviews gave the researcher access to an increased amount of data
and promotes increased reliability.
Interview questions utilized in Runyan‘s (2006) ―Small Business in the
Face of Crisis‖ research served as a guide and provided preliminary questions
for this study. Finalization of the interview questions occurred following
examination of the survey data results. Based on the survey results there was
no need to add additional questions. ―An interview guide was used to help the
researcher stay on track; ensure that important issues and topics are addressed;
provide a framework and sequence for the questions; and help to maintain some
consistency across interviews with different respondents‖ (Mullins, 2007, p. 42).
For convenience purposes, the interviews took place at the various small
business locations in Hancock County. Five semi-structured interview sessions
aided in learning about the occurrences and strategies used based on the
business owners‘ observations. During each interview, the researcher used
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open-ended questions to allow the participants flexibility in their responses
(Patton, 1990).
Table 3.3
Interview Questions Matrix
Measure (Interview Questions)

Research Objective (RO)

Q1 (sub questions a-e)

Address RO-2, strategies implemented preKatrina in preparation for future disasters

Q2 (sub questions b-f)

Address RO-3, strategies implemented postKatrina in preparation for future disasters

Q3 (sub questions c-f)

Address RO-1, strategies implemented during
Katrina recovery relative to financial barriers
to recovery

Q3 (sub questions g-j)

Address RO-4, identify characteristics of a
resilient small business owner

Interview question one explored strategies related to RO-2, strategies
business owners‘ implemented pre-Katrina. The researcher asked business
owners about plans, in place prior to the storm, to handle physical, business
disaster and financial assets. Question two explored strategies related to RO-3,
strategies business owners‘ implemented post-Katrina. Interview question three
addressed RO-1, strategies business owners implemented related to financial
barriers to recovery. The researcher questioned business owners about barriers
to recovery initially introduced by Runyan‘s (2006) research. The last four
research questions explored RO-4, characteristics of a resilient business owner.
Interview Recording
The interviews were audio taped to accurately record responses from the
interviews for transcription and analysis. The researcher acquired participant
permission, through consent forms, to record responses prior to the onset of the
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interview. Analysis of the transcriptions using the constant comparative method
first introduced in grounded theory occurred (Strauss & Corbin, 1994). The
constant comparative method, described as a method for ―joint coding and
analysis of qualitative data has four distinct stages: comparing incidents
applicable to each category, integrating categories and their properties, delimiting
the theory, and writing the theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The method involves
―comparing one segment of data with another to determine similarities and
differences. Data are grouped together on a similar dimension‖ (Merriam, 1998,
p.18). Constant comparative method allows categorization and analysis of data
until placed in an appropriate category (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The
transcriptions identified recurrent themes related to the nature of the small
business owners‘ experiences recovering from Hurricane Katrina, as well as the
strategies used to overcome barriers to recovery.
Field Notes
Descriptive and reflective field notes documented written accounts of
observations during the focus groups, as well as the researcher‘s interpretations
related to other observations (McMillan, 2000). After each interview, the field
notes and recollections were transcribed separately for later discussion and
analysis (Alesch et al., 2001).
Threats to Validity
As collection, examination, interpretation and dissemination of information
occurs, all research possesses some degree of threats to validity. This section
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describes three threats within this studies‘ assessment of Hurricane Katrina
recovery.
Maturation
Data collection for this study occurred five years after Hurricane Katrina
made landfall and maturation is an internal threat to validity, which had potential
to affect the responses of the respondents. Campbell and Stanley (1963) refer to
maturation as ―those biological or psychological processes which systematically
vary with the passage of time, independent of specific external events‖ (pp. 7–8).
Participants report information and shared the experience from their own
perspective; however, the extended time lapse between the disaster event and
data collection has the potential to cause submission of inaccurate information.
Business owners could have forgotten pertinent information or the exact details
of key events.
Low Response Rate
Dillman (2007) suggests response rates in online surveys are low,
typically around 20%. In an attempt to curtail this threat, the researcher used
several strategies to reduce nonresponse as suggested in Dillman‘s (2007)
research. After several contacts with OTBMA, 13 association members
completed the survey. Of the 13 respondents, 11 report usable data. Due to the
low response rate, the researcher modified the methodology to ensure reliability
of the study. ―The extent to which results are consistent over time and an
accurate representation of the total population under study is referred to as
reliability. If the results of a study can be reproduced under a similar
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methodology, then the research instrument is considered to be reliable‖ (Joppe,
2000, p. 1). The original methodology included a mixture of survey research
followed by two focus groups. The research methodology was modified from two
focus groups to five in-depth interviews. The five interviews give the researcher
access to an increased amount of data and promote increased reliability.
History
An additional threat to validity that occurred during this study included an
environmental disaster. Campbell and Stanley (1963) define history threats as
specific events, in addition to the treatment, that occur between the first and
second measurement. In the case of this study, a history threat occurred during
the time of data collection. In April 2010, participants of this study experienced
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Scientist classifies the Horizon as the largest
accidental marine oil spill in the history of the petroleum industry (Robertson &
Krauss, 2010). The oil flowed in the Gulf of Mexico for three consecutive months
before being capped off. This disaster affected businesses along the Mississippi,
Florida and Louisiana Gulf Coasts. Data collection for this research study
occurred during the time span that businesses were undergoing implications and
impacts from the new disaster. The Deep Horizon oil spill could have influenced
the data submitted via surveys and interviews.
Data Analysis
Parikh (2002) suggests data analysis establishes linkages between a
study‘s research objectives and outcomes. In accordance with Creswell (2003),
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the researcher took the following steps to address the studies four-research
objectives through surveys research.
In a study entitled, ―Workplace Implications for Hurricane Affected Gulf
Coast Regional Industrial Companies,‖ Boullion (2007) utilized steps to interpret
quantitative data from survey research. As per Boullion (2007), the researcher
took the following steps to analyze and interpret the survey results of this study:
1.

The data obtained from respondents for survey questions one

through four determined if the respondent met the selection criteria for
participation in the study.
2.

Individual and organizational demographic identifiers, (i.e. age, type

of industry and owner‘s assessment of business‘ property damages from
the hurricane) was categorical nominal data. Items within each of those
questions were analyzed, tabulated and reported as frequency counts
(Boullion, 2007). Descriptive tables display these data where appropriate.
3.

Several survey questions request current data weighed against 2005

pre- Katrina data. Comparison occurs between the current data and 2005
pre-Katrina data. Descriptive tables display the analysis of these data
where appropriate.
Also in accordance with Creswell (2003), the researcher took the
following steps to address the studies four RO‘s through individual in-depth
interviews. The researcher began by interviewing each participant individually
and all interviews were audio taped with the written permission of the business
owner. Prior to starting the interview, the owners were reassured that all
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information obtained would remain confidential. All interviews occurred at the
actual business locations in Bay St. Louis, Mississippi. The decision to conduct
the research at the business location allowed the owner to feel comfortable and
safe to share information, as well as, allowed the researcher to draw inferences
and conclusions based on the business environment. The duration of each
interview equaled approximately one hour.
Upon completion of all interviews, a small company outside of the state of
Mississippi transcribed the audio tapes, which helped to insure confidentiality. In
order to protect confidentiality, the researcher assigned each owner initials to
represent their business (BO-1, BO-2, BO-3, etc). The pseudonyms identify the
individual participants throughout the entire data analysis process. The
transcriptions were downloaded into the NVivo 8 Software, qualitative data
analysis software developed by QSR International. The NVivo 8‘s software
design helps organize and analyze unstructured information like documents,
videos, surveys or voice recordings (NVivo, 2010). This software aided in the
analysis of data and generation of themes. The researcher recurrently read data
until saturation in order to obtain a general sense of the information and allow
reflection on its overall meaning (Creswell, 2003). The coding process allowed
the researcher to categorize data from each interview session into a manageable
format (Creswell, 2003; McMillan, 2000; Yin, 1994). ―Coding is the process of
organizing the material into ‗chunks‘ before bringing meaning to those ‗chunks‘
(Rossman & Rallis, 1998, p. 171). Marshall and Rossman (1989) define this
stage as the process of ―bringing order, structure and meaning to the mass of
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collected data‖ (n. p.). The researcher employed content analysis to look for
recurring patterns among the data. Labeled terms identify emerging themes of
similarities or marked differences among the business owners within each
category. Based on the coding process, a description of the setting, people and
emergent themes were generated.
Summary
Chapter III contained a brief recap of the purpose of the study as well as a
re-introduction of the research objectives. The chapter discussed the mixed
methods research design and its benefits to this research study. The chapter
discussed information on participants, as well as, the sample selection method.
Chapter III presented an outline of the data collection procedures and data
analysis process. Chapter IV presents the findings of the survey and the in-depth
interview sessions. Chapter V summarizes the study and presents conclusions,
implications and recommendations for future research.
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CHAPTER IV
FINDINGS
The purpose of this study was to determine how ―recovered‖ small
business owners in Mississippi overcame financial barriers to recovery after
Hurricane Katrina. The study explores the process of business recovery from the
small business owners‘ perspective. This chapter identifies and describes the
recovery strategies used by small business owners in Hancock County,
Mississippi after Hurricane Katrina and includes discussion of the relationship
between survey and interview data and the study‘s research objectives.
Through a mixed methods research design, the study accomplishes the
following research objectives:
RO-1: Determine strategies ―recovered‖ small business owners in
Hancock County, Mississippi implemented during Hurricane Katrina
recovery relative to:
v1. lack of access to capital for recovery post-Hurricane Katrina.
V2.

vulnerability to cash flow post-Hurricane Katrina.

RO-2: Identify strategies ―recovered‖ small business owners in Hancock
County, Mississippi, implemented pre-Hurricane Katrina in
preparation for future disasters.
RO-3: Identify strategies ―recovered‖ small business owners in Hancock
County, Mississippi, implemented post-Hurricane Katrina in
preparation for future disasters.
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RO-4: Identify characteristics of a resilient small business owner as
perceived by ―recovered‖ small business owners in Hancock
County, Mississippi.
Population
The population focus for this study includes all small business owners
from Hancock County, Mississippi affected by Hurricane Katrina. The population
sample for this study is derived from the active small business members of the
Old Town Bay St. Louis Merchants Association (OTBMA). The association
includes a group of independent shop owners who band together to
cooperatively promote the Old Town Shopping District.
Relationship of Data and Research Objectives
In order to address the study‘s research objectives, a structured online
survey via Survey Monkey was designed to collect data, which offered
quantitative data for the study. The results from responses received from
participants were organized into an Excel spreadsheet and displayed as charts
and graphs. The results offer descriptive and demographic data.
The researcher attended the June 2010 OTBMA monthly meeting to
introduce the research, disseminate introduction letters and offer the option to
complete the survey that day. For those business owners who chose to complete
the survey online, the Bay Waveland Mainstreet Association disseminated the
survey link via email. All 40 members of the OTBMA received the link. Thirteen
small business owners responded to the survey. Two of the 13 surveys returned
failed to meet the study‘s selection criteria, which were: a) small business owner
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with membership in OTBMA; b) business address within Hancock County,
Mississippi; c) business in operation prior to Hurricane Katrina; d) business
currently open; and e) owner availability and voluntary agreement to participate
in interviews. Only 11 of the 13 returned surveys were usable. The primary
means of completing the survey was through the online link; however,
participants also had the option to submit a hard copy of the survey to the
researcher at the end of an OTBMA meeting or to print, complete and forward a
hard copy via U.S. Postal Service to a specific mail address. Of the 13 surveys
collected, two were completed during the monthly meeting briefing, three were
collected through online submission and eight were collected via U.S. Postal
Service. To ensure consistency in data entry, the researcher entered all hard
copy versions received (10 documents total) into the online survey (Fleischer &
Nickel, 1995).
Survey Content
The first four questions of the survey include selection criteria
requirements, to determine which small business owners qualify for study
participation. In Question one, participants verify that the respective business
falls within the small business definition set forth by The Small Business
Association (SBA). The association classifies a small business as one that
typically maintains revenue considerably less than comparable units within a
larger corporation, employing fewer than 100 employees and is independently
owned and operated but not dominant in its field of operation (SBA, 2009).
Question two verifies that the business location is within Hancock County,

82
Mississippi. Question three confirms whether the business was in operation
before Hurricane Katrina made landfall and Question four establishes that the
business is currently in operation. The businesses that answered ―yes‖ to all four
questions completed the rest of the survey; those that did not meet the criteria
received instruction to submit the survey with only the four questions answered.
Questions 5-17, (see Appendix B), request demographic information
(gender of owner, business industry, number of years in business, geographical
market of customer base, number of employees), financial information (losses
sustained in sales and revenue) and business damage information (nature and
extent of damage). Response rates are displayed as frequency counts in the
following charts and figures. Table 4.1 summarizes the demographics of the
sample population.
Table 4.1
Demographic Information Represented by Sample Business Population
Demographic

Response Rate

1. Gender
Female
Male
M/F Team
TOTAL

7
0
4
n=11

2. Business Industry
Retail
Manufacturing
Service
Other
TOTAL

8
1
1
1
n=11
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Table 4 (continued).

Demographic

Response Rate

3. Years in Business before Katrina
1-4
5-9
10-14
15+
TOTAL

5
2
2
2
n=11

Gender of Owners
Survey Question five identifies gender of the business owners. Seven of
the 11 small business owners are female owned and operated. Male/female
teams own and operate four of the11 businesses that responded, and no surveys
were returned by males who own and operate businesses pre-Katrina.
Industry
Survey Question six inquires about the type of business owned prior to
Katrina. Retail businesses represent eight of 11 of the respondents. One
respondent reports operating in manufacturing and one in the service industry.
One business reports their business classification in the ―other industry‖
category.
Years in Business
Survey Question seven addresses the number of years in business
operation. Five of the 11 businesses are classified as new, only in operation from
1-4 years before Katrina. Out of the 11 respondents, two report being in
operation for each of the following time spans: 5-9 years, 10-14 years and 15+
years.
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Customer Base
Question eight inquires about geographical customer base pre-and-postKatrina. Concerning Question eight, seven of the 11 respondents service local
and regional communities in 2005 pre-Katrina. Post-Katrina, 10 of the 11
respondents report servicing local and regional communities. Pre-Katrina, zero
respondents report servicing customers on a national level. After the storm, two
respondents report expansion to service a national customer base. Figure 4.1
depicts changes in customer base pre-and-post-Katrina for the responding
businesses.

Figure 4.1. Geography of Customer Base (n=11).
Question nine of the survey solicits changes in the number of employees,
customers served and business profits. Table 4.2 displays changes in the three
aforementioned variables as frequency counts.
Number of Employees
Seven of the 11 respondents state the number of paid employees
remained the same after the hurricane. Only one of the 11 businesses
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experienced an increase in the number of employees post-Katrina, while three
respondents report a decrease in the number of paid employees post-Katrina.
Respondents attribute the reduction to employees having to move out of the area
due to loss of personal property.
Table 4.2
Frequency Counts of Employees, Customers and Business Profits
Variable
1. Number of Employees

2. Number of Customers
Served

Frequency Counts
Decreased
Remained the Same
Increased

3
7
1

TOTAL

n=11

Decreased
Remained the Same
Increased

3
7
1

TOTAL

n=11

Decreased
Remained the Same
Increased

8
2
1

TOTAL

n=11

3. Business Profits

Number of Customers Served
Seven of the 11 respondents observed a decrease in the number of
customers served post-Katrina. One business observes no change in number of
customers post-Katrina. However, three respondents report an increase in the
number of customers served and credits Internet marketing and products and
services marketed in surrounding cities.
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In Question18 of the survey, respondents report infrastructure damage as
one of the main hindrances affecting customers‘ accessibility to Bay St. Louis.
The Highway 90-Bay St. Louis Bridge, which serves as the main access to
Hancock County, remained closed for approximately two years after the
hurricane limiting entrance to the area.
Business Profits
Results show eight businesses experienced a decrease in business profits
post-Katrina. Two respondents report no change in profits; the owners were able
to maintain their business at the same level. Lastly, one business reports an
increase in business profits post-hurricane. The owner attributed the increase to
changes in product offered and modifications made to the marketing strategy to
reach national customers. Hurricane Katrina had different effects on business
profits; likewise, businesses experienced different types of damages.
Nature of Damage
Questions 10-11 of the survey inquire about the kind of damage the
businesses experienced. Respondents were asked whether the building was
damaged by the storm and the nature of those damages. Owners report the
nature of damage to business ranging from structural damage, damage to nonstructural elements, furnishing, equipment, inventory, damage due to looting and
other factors. Figure 4.2 offers a visual depiction of the types of damages
reported.
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Figure 4.2. Nature of Damage to Business Property (n=11).
Nine of the 11 businesses experienced structural damage, while eight
report damage to the non-structural parts of the building, such as windows,
partitions and water pipes. In addition, nine respondents received damages to
furnishings, equipment and inventory or stock. Three businesses report receiving
damage from looters after the hurricane.
Extent of Physical Damage to Businesses
Respondents were asked in Question 12 to indicate the extent of the
physical damage to the business. Choices ranged from very little to no damage,
to minor damage, to major damage but still able to use, to total loss and
impossible to use building.
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Major dam age, but s till pos s ible to us e

Total los s , im pos s ible to us e building

12

10

8

6

4
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0

Figure 4.3. Extent of Physical Damage to Property (n=11).
Six respondents report a total loss to building, making it impossible to use
the building in which the business was located post-Katrina. Respondents report
having 3-4 inches of mud inside the buildings, taking in five feet of water, loosing
entire roofs and buildings taken off the foundations, which resulted in complete
loss. The remaining five respondents report major damage to building from
Katrina but were able to use the building.
Questions 13-17 inquire about physical damages and the impact on
businesses. Question 13 asks, how disruptive was this physical damage to your
ability to do business. Choices ranged from not disruptive at all, not very
disruptive, disruptive and very disruptive. Eight respondents report the physical
damage was ―very disruptive‖ to the businesses‘ ability to conduct business and
three respondents report the damages as ―disruptive.‖ Question 14 asks, was the
business closed or inactive for any period because of the hurricane. All 11
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businesses were closed because of Katrina for some period of time.
Questions15-17 inquires about business losses in sales, revenues, or gross
income because of the hurricane and allowed respondents to give financial
estimates of those loses. All 11 respondents report loss in sales due to the
business closure.
Business owners experienced many issues that hindered recovery after
Hurricane Katrina. Question 18 of the survey inquires whether respondents
experienced various hindrances to post-hurricane recovery. The question
addresses RO-1, strategies implemented by small business owners in relation to
financial barriers to recovery.
Table 4.3
Business Experiences Post-Hurricane Katrina
Answer Options
1.

Employees unable to get to work

2.

Employees missing time to attend to personal
matters

Frequency
Count
6
6

3.

Damage to owner‘s own residence or other properties

10

4.

Decline in customer need for goods/services

8

5.

Owner‘s vulnerability to cash flow

8

6.

Problems caused by federal agencies (FEMA, SBA etc.)

8

7.

Lack of access to capital for recovery

9

8.

Serious infrastructure problems within city (Bridges and
roads out, no electricity, couldn‘t deliver products due

10

to transportation issues etc.)
9.

Could not get supplies/materials needed to run
business

4

10. Could not afford to pay employees

7

11. Business did not experience any of these problems

0

Note. n=11
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Respondents selected from several choices including but not limited to:
employees unable to work, damage to owner‘s own residence, decline in
customer need for goods, vulnerability to cash flow, lack of access to capital and
serious infrastructure problems.
According to Table 4.3, ten of the 11 respondents report experiencing
damage to their own residence and serious infrastructure problems. According
to the data, Hurricane Katrina affected business owners in Hancock County on
two levels. Business owners lost personal residences and lost businesses. Nine
of the 11 businesses report lack of access to capital for recovery as a hindering
variable; while an additional ten report serious infrastructure problems as a
hindrance. Eight businesses report problems caused by federal agencies as
hindering variables, while eight owners also report a decline in customer need for
services and vulnerability to cash flow as hindering variables.
SBA Loans
As Table 4.3 reports, one of the most frequently reported hindrances postKatrina includes issues caused by federal emergency agencies. Question 21 of
the survey asks, ―Did the business apply to the Small Business Administration
(SBA) for a loan to cover hurricane-related losses?‖ Five respondents did not
apply for an SBA loan for several different reasons including the excessive
guidelines and regulations.
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Figure 4.4. Outcome of SBA Loan Applications (n=6).
However, six businesses responding to the survey did apply for an SBA
loan. Respondents were asked about the outcome of their SBA loans in
Question 22, which address RO-1, strategies implemented in relation to financial
barriers to recovery. As shown in Figure 4.4 three of the six respondents that
applied for an SBA loan were denied their request. The remaining three fell into
one of the following categories: one business received all funds, one business
received partial funds, and one business received a loan but returned it unused.
The one owner, returning the loan unused, reports doing so because the SBA‘s
policy of placing liens on the recipients‘ assets was a huge drawback.
Insurance Policies
Question 19 of the survey requested information regarding insurance
coverage. Data from Question 19 indicate four out of 11 businesses had no
insurance and seven had one or more types of insurance. Question 20 of the
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survey, addressing RO-2, to determine strategies implemented by business
owners pre-Katrina, inquired about the type of insurance businesses held at the
time of the hurricane. Participants chose from one or more of the following
choices: insurance to cover wind damage, insurance to cover flood/water
damage, insurance to cover crop damage/agricultural losses, business
interruption insurance and other. Figure 4.5 illustrates insurance coverage held
by respondents.

Figure 4.5. Type of Insurance Carried by Business Owners (n=11).
The seven insured small businesses responding to the survey indicated a
minimum of wind damage coverage. Five of the seven responding insured
businesses held business interruption insurance, a type of insurance designed to
pay owners anticipated earnings based on uninterrupted business operations
(Childs, 2008).
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However, in regards to monies businesses received from insurance,
owners received minimum payments for the policies as reported by respondents
in the data. Homes and businesses alike were flooded as reported by nine of the
11 respondents and eight of the 11 respondents were located outside of the
federally specified flood zone; therefore did not hold flood coverage.
In general, business owners on the Gulf Coast faced an insurance crisis
following Hurricane Katrina. Even the seven owners indicating insurance
coverage in response to this survey faced hardships when attempting to collect
on policies. Since Hurricane Katrina, insurance premiums along the Gulf Coast
have quadrupled (Braley, 2007).
Financial State of Business
Question 23 of the survey requests a description of the financial state of
the business immediately prior to Hurricane Katrina and at the time of the survey.
Business owners indicate their financial state pre-and-post-Katrina based on the
following choices: in financial trouble: marginal, not in financial trouble but not
doing well, in good financial condition and in excellent financial condition. Figure
4.6 portrays the responses describing financial conditions of Gulf Coast
businesses pre-and-post-Hurricane Katrina.
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Figure 4.6. Financial State of Business before and after Katrina (n=11).
Five of the 11 respondents report their business being in good financial
condition pre-Katrina. Another five businesses report being in excellent financial
condition pre-Katrina and one business left the question blank.
When asked about the financial condition of the business post-Katrina,
some businesses report a very different financial state. Of the 11 business
owners responding to this question, four respondents express having marginal
financial trouble post-Katrina. Three respondents report being in good financial
condition, two businesses report not in financial trouble but not doing well either
and only one respondent reports excellent financial conditions post-Katrina. One
respondent left the question blank.
Pre-and-Post-Katrina Preparation
Question 24 of the survey, relating to RO-2 and RO-3, asks participants
about the types of preparation taken before Katrina, as well as preparation taken
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since Katrina. Respondents could select multiple choices from the following:
receiving written information on hurricane preparedness, talking with employees
about what to do in the event of a disaster, purchased flood insurance, made
arrangements to move business location, obtained emergency generators,
conducting hurricane drills or exercises with employees, purchasing special
equipment to prevent damage and developing a disaster recovery plan.
Research suggests that in the wake of disasters, poor preparation, planning and
management serve as key sources of organizational failure (Booth, 1990;
McKinley, 1993; Smith, 1990). Figure 4.7 depicts the preparation and recovery
efforts undertaken by small business owners in Hancock County, Mississippi preand-post-Katrina.

Figure 4.7. Preparation and Recovery Plans (n=11).
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Before Hurricane Katrina, the extent of disaster preparation included,
talking to employees about steps to take in the event of a hurricane (nine
businesses), receiving written information on hurricane preparedness (nine
businesses), purchasing special windows, shutters or protective materials to
prevent wind damage (seven businesses) and purchasing flood insurance (five
businesses). Small actions, those requiring little time and effort to perform, were
reported most frequently by respondents (talking to employees and receiving
written information). The data show very little formal preparation existed before
the storm. All of the 11 responding business owners surveyed prepared as they
had before for other approaching storms, except one business owner, reporting
lack of engagement in any type of disaster planning. The extent of the
preparation included conducting basic evacuation procedures, such as boarding
windows and securing doors.
After Hurricane Katrina, data from the surveys reveals a wide array of
more involved steps taken to prepare for future storms. Five out of the 11
responding business owners have since developed a business recovery plan,
while three have arranged to move the business to another location in case of a
hurricane. Two businesses report actively conducting hurricane drills or
exercises; hence, data from the surveys indicate small businesses acknowledge
a need for better preparation.
In this study, the survey data supplemented in-depth interviews (Creswell,
2003; Morse 1991). The survey data remain essential to the study as it provides
a rich background of the dynamics of businesses in Hancock County pre-and-
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post-Katrina. This section offers a quantitative illustration of the population; thus,
playing a supportive role to the second method of data collection: qualitative
interviews.
Interview Findings
Interviews of five recovered small business owners helped the researcher
gain understanding of experiences with Hurricane Katrina and helped explore
details of recovery strategies. Conducting in-depth interviews allowed intimate
interface between the researcher and the business owners and generated
comprehensive descriptions from each owner. During the interviews the
researcher observed and documented within the field notes each owners‘ tone,
non-verbal gestures and body language. The interviews provided data, which
helped accomplish RO-1 through RO-4. Prior research supports the notion that
the research objectives of the current study are important to disaster recovery
(Alesch, 2001; Henderson, 1997; Runyan, 2006). The researcher, therefore,
began by utilizing this study‘s research objectives as original themes. After an indepth reading of the research data, the researcher confirmed additional
emergent themes. The following information describes each participating
business owner.
Case Description: Business Owner 1 (BO-1)
The first business owner (referred to as BO-1 henceforth), was a
male/female team in their mid-50‘s who operate within the retail and
manufacturing industry. The female owner participated in the interview. For 15
years, BO-1 operated as a small business owner serving the local Mississippi
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Gulf Coast and outlying cities within the Gulf Coast Region. Originally, the
building housed two separate businesses: a dress shop and an antique gallery.
However, the dress section was destroyed and closed after Katrina.
The business currently houses paintings, sculptures, and other art
paraphernalia from various local and national artists. As Katrina approached the
coast, BO-1 conducted the normal hurricane preparation: boarding up windows
and doors. Despite their preparation, BO-1 received major damage to the
building, which caused a 30-day business closure post-Katrina. The owners had
wind damage insurance but received only a marginal payout. Owners‘ personal
contingency funds financed the majority of the rebuilding. However, along with
the help of family, friends and other business owners, the business was able to
renovate, reopen and take in other owners from the community into their building
space. Rebuilding and reorganization occurred with a great deal of care and
thought, as evidenced by the fact that the workspaces were very meticulous and
well organized. In listening to the Katrina story from the business owners‘
perspective, the female interviewee expressed great sorrow; yet, there was a
manifested inner strength. BO-1 spoke of an interview with a well-known
television station in which she said, ―he had to go somewhere else to get the
crock tears…and that‘s what sells on television but it wasn‘t here….we get up
everyday, it‘s a new day, and we‘re thankful that we‘re alive.‖ There was a
resounding resilience theme throughout the interview. BO-1 also spoke of the
possibilities for improvement to Hancock County brought about by the hurricane.
―We have new plumbing and a water system, the electric, everything here is like
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a brand new little town…yeah, which is nice. It hadn‘t been changed for fifty
years….it was time; yeah we had to look at something good.‖ BO-1 expressed
the challenges brought on by Katrina but was also thankful for the improvements
Katrina brought.
Case Description: Business Owner 2 (BO-2)
BO-2 is a female owned business within the service industry. The
business was in operation approximately three years prior to Katrina and has
been in business for one-year post-Katrina. As the hurricane approached the
Gulf Coast, BO-2 admits the lack of preparation undertaken as she stated, ―I did
not move anything or do anything…I was in complete denial.‖ The business had
conducted extensive preparation for Hurricane Ivan the year prior and the storm
turned and missed the coast.
As BO-2 explains preparation for Hurricane Ivan, she states,
I had prepared for Ivan like it was the end of the world and so
nothing happened with Ivan. I moved all the furniture out. Like took
everything with me, loaded it up...um boarded windows, stockpiled
supplies and that sort of thing for Ivan. When that one hit
Pensacola, instead…it was going to hit us and then it moved
towards Pensacola. So Katrina, you know, was a very bad storm
but I thought the same thing. Well, I‘m not going to go through all
this again because I‘m busy and it‘s probably just going to go
somewhere else anyway.

100
The owner predicted Katrina would do the same. Immediately after the
hurricane passed, BO-2 returned to the building to find that Katrina had not
missed the coast and the business experienced a total loss. The building was still
standing but was off its foundation and the roof was gone. There was four feet of
muck and mud inside of the building; therefore, equipment and supplies inside
was not salvageable. Eventually, the building was bulldozed. BO-2 did have
insurance coverage on the business; however, after a year of negotiating with the
insurance company she received notification that no payout on the policy would
occur. The owner contacted FEMA for assistance and received advice to falsify
information to qualify for help. She immediately decided against lying; therefore,
BO-2 went to work for another business owner in a different part of the city and
began to save money to rebuild her own business. After four years of personally
saving finances to rebuild, BO-2 re-opened the business in downtown Bay St.
Louis, Mississippi. When asked why she remained and reopened on the Gulf
Coast after such a devastating event, BO-2 stated, ―it‘s like a family here and
there‘s just something that just draws me to this area.‖ BO-2 left the following
advice to other business owners, ―don‘t count on anybody, don‘t count on
insurance, don‘t count on the government…you just better save some money up
just in case.‖ Although the owner did not cry during the interview, there was
intense emotion exhibited through her tone as the disappointment, regret and
loss from Katrina was revisited.
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Case Description: Business Owner 3 (BO-3)
Two female business partners own and operate business three. The
business partners lived in the area their entire lives and were accustomed to
hurricane evacuations. In operation for approximately nine years, the business
exists within the retail industry. For the first five years the business was housed
at a different location within Hancock County but Katrina destroyed the building
causing the location to change to its current site.
As Katrina approached, the owners performed the normal preparation
activities. Owner BO-3 stated, ―We have lived in the area our entire lives so we
basically know what needs to be done to evacuate. We always prepare the
business, first we pick up all the important papers; we board up, secure
everything and then secure our homes. This was no different, the only thing
different being that we had nothing left.‖ BO-3 held business interruption,
property, wind and flood insurance policies. The May before Katrina made
landfall, the owners increased the business interruption policy to $50,000;
however, after Katrina the owner‘s found that the transaction was not complete.
The insurance company deposited the insurance payment but failed to pay the
underwriter. Therefore, the business coverage remained at the original coverage
amount of $7,500. After negotiating with the insurance company, the business
was awarded $11,000 above their original coverage amount; however, not the
coverage amount the policy was increased to before the storm. The business
received a full payout for the policy that covered inventory and equipment.
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BO-3 applied for and received funds from the SBA for the business,
although the process took over a year. According to data derived from the
interview, the average business application totaled approximately 75 pages and
required faxing of information. According to interview data, BO-3, ―faxed the
packet probably 11 or 12 times.‖ In addition, there was still no electricity in
Hancock County; therefore, the closest access to a fax machine was in
Covington or Mandeville, Louisiana, which was approximately one hour away.
Each time after receiving confirmation of a successful fax, BO-3 received
notification that the information did not arrive. The owner started the loan process
in September of 2005 and finally closed the business loan in December of 2006.
BO-3 admitted, ―SBA, by itself, was almost a full time job and was the most
frustrating part‖ of the process. During the interview, BO-3 suggested the SBA
could improve efficiency if the application process was streamlined.
The remainder of the funds needed to rebuild and continue to recover
after Katrina came from BO-3‘s personal contingency savings and retirement
money. After reopening, the business saw huge profits, ―We were up our first
year… we were up 165% our first roll here from what we were doing before the
storm,‖ stated BO-3. However, the financial strain escalated within the five years
after Katrina. Insurance premiums after Katrina increased drastically and the
respondent expressed the strain premiums have caused. BO-3 stated, ―We were
paying $8000 for a combination between our business and our personal home
before the storm. The first two years after we were back in, we paid $34,000
total on insurance. And this year we‘re down to $28,000 but still it‘s depleted all
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of our savings, all of our retirement.‖ Unfortunately, the increase in sales
remains inadequate to cover the insurance premiums. When asked to rewind to
the time immediately after Katrina and explain what would be done differently,
BO-3 stated, ―Move.‖ As the owner revisited Katrina‘s recovery process, great
frustration, regret and abhorrence was exhibited in the tone.
Case Description: Business Owner 4 (BO-4)
BO-4 describes a slightly different experience with Katrina than the other
business owners. The business is female owned and operated and is part of the
manufacturing industry. Right before Katrina hit the coast, BO-4 entered a
partnership to open an art gallery in the Bay St. Louis area. As Katrina
approached, owners took the usual precautions; boarding up doors and windows
and packing vital records and items into two small vehicles. When asked if the
business had a formal plan to handle the financial aspects of recovery, BO-4
stated, ―Yeah, I did and it‘s basically the same plan we always had… that just
didn‘t work in Katrina.‖ The business had no insurance, as most gallery owners
do not provide insurance for individual artists displaying work in the gallery
because of risk of damage. ―It‘s just such a big risk that all artists are responsible
for their own insurance and I have never carried any on my work and I still don‘t.‖
The hurricane had great impact on the business; hence, BO-4 lost hundreds of
pieces of artwork in Katrina. The story changes for most businesses at this point.
Four days after the storm BO-4 returned to the downtown area. Nine days after
returning, the owner changed the product offered and began working on artwork.
The owner transitioned from producing landscape paintings, which can be
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expensive, to producing mixed media assemblages out of hurricane debris. The
cost of transition was minimal, as there was an excess of debris everywhere and
it was free. Five weeks after the storm, BO-4 and other business colleagues
collaborated to open a gallery and on the first day open, the business generated
revenue. BO-4 stated, ―I sold more money in my art the last five years than I
probably did the rest of my life before then. As awful as Katrina was in a lot of
ways, it um…made a huge, tremendous, positive difference in my business.‖
BO-4 has extended the marketing to a national level and the business
received national recognition for Hurricane Katrina artwork. BO-4 attributes the
quick recovery and success to both: the changes made in product offered and
Internet marketing. She took advantage of the demand within the new business
environment for Katrina related artwork and shared it with the customers all over
the nation. ―If you got problems in your front door you better go out the back door
and find a new neighborhood,‖ stated BO-4. The owner stated marketing and
reaching out to a larger audience saved the business. BO-4 left the interviewer
with this last thought about Katrina, ―It‘s been a weird mixture for me of difficulties
since Katrina and because of Katrina, but also really good things have happened
as a result.‖ The owner‘s tone expressed great optimism for the future of small
businesses in Hancock County, Mississippi.
Case Description: Business Owner 5 (BO-5)
Owned and operated by a male/female team near 70 years old, business
five has operated for approximately 15 years within the retail industry. BO-5
experienced several hurricanes over the years on the coast and always stayed at
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home or at a local shelter in the area during storms. As the hurricane
approached, meteorologist warned those still in Hancock County to leave
because there were no safe shelters to occupy. The couple left the coast Sunday
afternoon and Katrina hit early Monday morning. It took BO-5 ten days to return
to see that their business sustained substantial structural damage. The owners
took the usual hurricane preparation precautions; boarding up the eight plate
glass windows along the storefront. Unfortunately, the wind blew underneath the
boards and broke every window. Four inches of muck and mud from the Gulf
rushed into the store destroying the inventory inside. The couple had insurance
coverage but found later that it only covered fire, broken water pipes or looting.
The financial losses were not recoverable or reclaimable via insurance. The
owners received no insurance payout for the business and the Mississippi
Development Historical Grant denied the business application. BO-5 stated,
―Anywhere I tried to apply, I didn‘t fit in...I didn‘t fit that category, anywhere I tried
to apply.‖ Therefore, the couple used contingency funds, in the form of personal
savings and retirement money, to rebuild. When speaking about the lack of help
from the insurance company, BO-5 stated, ―Rebuilding was all out of my own
pocket…my own retirement money.‖ Before Katrina hit, the couple was preparing
to sell the business and retire. Katrina prohibited plans to retire. After almost a
year and a half of rebuilding, the couple changed from a tuxedo and costume
shop to an antique shop. BO-5 collaborated with other local businesses that lost
their buildings and came together to open the new business. In closing the
interview BO-5 mentioned, ―I can‘t retire…now I gotta die with my boots on.‖ The
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owner expressed aggravation, anger and dissatisfaction with Katrina‘s recovery
process, yet, displayed a resilient attitude.
Similarities among Businesses
Although the five businesses were diverse in a variety of ways, results show
similarities. Caucasian owners, native to the Louisiana and Mississippi Gulf
Coast, operate all five businesses. Because of their geographical background,
owners previously experienced the hurricane evacuation process and the hassle
of getting back to a sense of normalcy post-hurricane. Each interviewee held a
small employee base (less than five employees), all were operated by one or two
people. Small business owners have a small tolerance threshold or maximum
time the business can afford to be without revenue before the viability of the
business reaches jeopardy (Hillenbrand, 2009). Each owner reports living off the
day-to-day business profits. This caused great vulnerability to cash flow after
Katrina, as for some period, all businesses experienced closure and a halt in
cash flow. Each of the five business owners interviewed utilized personal
contingency funds to recover and rebuild after Katrina. Every owner declares the
importance of having access to personal finances and how detrimental not
possessing those finances are to a business. Lastly, two businesses received no
help from insurance, SBA, or other grant programs and three received only
minimal help. Four out of five business owners struggled financially while going
through the bureaucracy of the government agencies and insurance companies.
The experiences of the five businesses were very similar in nature; however,
there was one difference highlighted.
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Differences among Businesses
The data highlight one difference among the five businesses worth
mentioning. During the interviews, BO-4 stated, "I found help everywhere I
went," when speaking of financial and physical help acquired after the hurricane.
During a separate interview, BO-5 stated, ―Anywhere I tried to apply I didn‘t fit
in…I didn‘t fit that category, anyway I tried to apply.‖ After exploring and
analyzing the interviews, the data suggest that businesses that relied on
―general‖ help had a different perspective of the helping agencies. ―General
help‖ refers to aid that everyone affected received regardless of circumstances.
After Katrina, FEMA issued emergency funds to every person in the affected
area. ―We had received that initial emergency amount that they sent everyone. I
think it was like maybe $2600,‖ stated BO-4. Eventually, the Chamber of
Commerce made computers available for residents, the Mississippi Army
National Guard provided water and ice and the American Red Cross offered
various kinds of aid. BO-4 had no insurance and did not apply for any grants or
SBA funds; therefore, the extent of the businesses‘ experience with helping
agencies was through aid offered to all residents of Hancock County who were
affected by the storm. Hence, BO-4 had a positive outlook on agencies offering
―general help‖ to the county post-Katrina.
On the other hand, businesses relying on formal agencies (i.e., insurance,
grants, SBA) had a different perspective of the effectiveness of agencies postKatrina. Four out of five interviewees dealt with insurance companies, FEMA for
trailers or SBA for personal and business loans. Stricter and more specific
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guidelines exist for distribution of financial aid from these agencies. Therefore,
the businesses that struggled to receive aid from these agencies held a more
negative view of the helpfulness of these organizations. In conclusion, one
business had a positive view because of the type of ‗general‘ aid received;
whereas, other businesses held a negative view because the aid sought
contained strict stipulations and eligibility criteria.
Themes
Qualitative analysis of the five in-depth interviews identified four key
themes related to effective recovery strategies. The following four themes relate
to the study‘s research objectives: expansion of customer base, community
collaboration, adjusted business objectives and personal or self-insurance.
Business owners described the following themes as key tasks, which performed
prior to a storm, have the ability to reduce post-disaster reaction time. Table 4.4
illustrates the association between the study‘s research objectives and themes.
Table 4.4
Relationship between Research Objectives (RO) and Themes
Research Objective

Theme

RO-1a:

Theme:

Determine strategies implemented
during Hurricane Katrina recovery
relative to:

The following themes links to RO-1a:

a. Vulnerability to cash flow

a. Expand customer base
Self-insure recovery
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Table 4.4 (continued).

Research Objective

RO-1b:
Determine strategies implemented
during Hurricane Katrina recovery
relative to:

Theme

The following themes links to RO-1b:

b. Community collaboration
Self-insure recovery

b. Lack of access to capital

RO-2:

Theme:

Identify strategies implemented preKatrina in preparation for future
disasters

The following themes links to RO-2:

RO-3:

Theme:

Identify strategies implemented postKatrina in preparation for future
disasters

The following themes links to RO-3:

RO-4:

Theme:

Identify characteristics of a resilient
small business owner

The following theme links to RO-4:

a. Expand customer base
b. Community collaboration
c. Self-insure recovery

a. Adjust business objectives
b. Community collaboration

a.

Community collaboration

Theme One: Expand Customer Base
Theme one, expansion of customer base, addresses RO-1 and RO-2.
RO-1 determines strategies ―recovered‖ small business owners in Hancock
County, Mississippi implemented during Hurricane Katrina recovery relative to:
(a) lack of access to capital for recovery post-Hurricane Katrina and (b)
vulnerability to cash flow post-Hurricane Katrina. RO-2 identifies strategies
―recovered‖ small business owners in Hancock County, Mississippi, implemented
pre-Hurricane Katrina in preparation for future disasters.
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Infrastructure damage was reported as a barrier to business recovery after
Katrina, preventing customers from reaching the local small businesses. As
suggested by Alesch et al. (2001) small businesses gain revenue from day-today business operation. When the inflow of customers decreases, business
profits also decrease. In response to this barrier, business owners found
innovative ways to reach their customer base and increase business revenue.
One business utilized Internet marketing and currently has a national reputation.
Another owner stated, ―prior to Katrina, lots of, almost 85% of my business came
from New Orleans. We drive over there…I do shows in New Orleans.‖ This
business owner had access to clientele outside of the area affected in
Mississippi. Other businesses reached outside of the local market to regional or
national markets also. As reported in the survey data, pre-Katrina, no
respondents serviced customers on a national level. After the storm, two
respondents report expansion to service a national customer base. Customer
base expansion allowed the businesses to reach new clientele, which allowed
cash flow to continue and addresses lack of access to capital and vulnerability to
cash flow after a hurricane.
Theme Two: Community Collaboration
A reciprocal agreement is an agreement between two or more
organizations to share resources in the event of a disaster (Hillenbrand, 2009).
Agreements within a community strengthens resiliency, the ability to bounce
back, as suggested by data from four of the five businesses. Community
collaboration addresses RO-1 through RO-4. Four owners collaborated and
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shared business space after Katrina. BO-1 and BO-4 collaborated to reopen and
took in eight other small businesses. This collaboration helped in two ways:
a) offered owners a reestablishment location to make inventory available and b)
decreased recovery timelines. It took only five weeks for the network of
businesses to repair the building and have a grand re-opening. BO-5 opened the
damaged shop and took in six other antique dealers who completely lost their
shops. The collaboration agreement enabled businesses to re-establish the
ability to offer an acceptable level of product to customers and continue revenue
flow. The data from interviews indicate that having a collaboration agreement in
place relieves the financial and physical burden from a single business owner;
thus allowing the owners to restore business processes quickly. Alesch et al.
(2001) suggests, ―the longer a business is unable to supply its previous
customers with services, the less likely the business will survive‖ (p. 21).
Data from this study suggests that theme two, community collaboration is
a strategy that is most effective when implemented pre-disaster but is beneficial
when implemented post-disaster (RO-and RO-3). A crisis requires quick decision
making under time pressure (Pearson & Clair, 1998). Pre-disaster, the decision
to form partnerships is made during a time of less stress from disaster related
issues. However, the data shows that post-disaster collaboration is
advantageous also as indicated by the successful implementation by the
respondents from this study.
Community collaboration also addresses RO-4, identifying characteristics
of a resilient small business owner. The interviews exposed a closeness and
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sense of accountability to the community and other locals that reaches far
beyond the houses, cars and personal items taken by Katrina. Interviewees
expressed a personal community connection that encouraged rebuilding in spite
of the hardships faced during and after the storm. This connection and ―coming
together‖ brings strength to this community, as mentioned throughout the
interviews. According to BO-3, ―the most difficult part is that I have lost so many
friends. That‘s been the most difficult thing for me. That people that I was close to
for years and years left the area and they‘re not coming back. I mean it‘s
obvious, things can be replaced but people can‘t. You know, people that, you
just wonder how they‘re doing and wish they would come back.‖ Based on the
interviews and research conducted on resiliency models (Henderson, 1997),
community collaboration is a characteristic resilient business owners possess
and remains evident in the Hancock County respondents who participated in this
study.
Theme Three: Adjust Business Objectives
The third theme surfacing addresses RO-3, identification of strategies
―recovered‖ small business owners in Hancock County, Mississippi, implemented
post-Hurricane Katrina in preparation for future disasters. Survey data from this
study report eight of the 11 respondents experienced a decline in customer need
for their businesses‘ goods or services within the new environment post-Katrina.
In order to thrive, many owners changed business objectives to fit the needs of
the new environment. For example, BO-1 began offering painted memorabilia of
items salvaged from the hurricane; BO-2 kept the same business objective but
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relocated to a different area and worked with another business owner. BO-4
stopped manufacturing regular paintings and used hurricane debris to begin an
art collection specific to Hurricane Katrina. BO-5 changed from a dress/tuxedo
shop to an antique shop because local citizens required furniture and household
items as home rebuilding began. In these instances, a complete change of
business idea was not required; however, a modification in business process was
warranted to meet the new objectives. Businesses adjusted type of product
offered to meet the demand within ―the new normalcy.‖ According to Alesch et
al. (2001) business owners must recognize the post-event market for goods and
services; hence, businesses must adapt to the demand in the new market.
Alesch et al. (2001) also declares, a business that can sufficiently meet business
objectives set, is profitable within the new economic environment and conducts
business for one year post-event is a ―recovered‖ business. The five interviewees
displayed adaptability and recovery after Katrina's devastating blow, meeting the
definition of a ―recovered‖ business.
Theme Four: Personal or Self-Insurance
The fourth theme links to RO-1 of the study. RO-1 determines strategies
―recovered‖ business owners implemented relative to lack of access to capital
and vulnerability to cash flow post-Hurricane Katrina. Data from the survey
administered in this study indicate four out of 11 businesses had no insurance
and seven had one or more types of insurance. The seven owners indicating
insurance coverage; received minimum payments for the policies as reported
by respondents in the survey data. One common premise through the five
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interviews was the owners‘ use of personal contingency funds to offset the lack
of insurance payout and to regain business operation. Two business owners
utilized personal retirement money, two utilized money from family and
personal savings and one had to save money in order to rebuild the business.
The researcher inquired, ―Was there a plan to handle financial aspects of the
business?‖ The business owner stated, ―We had cash…everything was dealt
with in cash. There was no income but we had savings and we went into our
savings.‖ The researcher presented the question, ―If you didn‘t get the
insurance money for your business, how did you reopen?‖ The owner
responded, ―My own …my retirement money; it was all out of my pocket, so
now I can‘t retire.‖
All five respondents report diminished trust and loss of faith in
insurance companies. In addressing RO-2, data from this study suggests
that business owners should prepare financially post-disaster by selfinsuring. The monies can be used during disaster response for business
operations and recovery. Two of the five businesses currently do not have
any insurance at all. BO-1 states, ―Insurance is a disaster and that‘s why
people can‘t afford to be back here. We do not have a mortgage on
anything and we have it saved...if there is a problem, we have it and we‘ll
do it ourselves.‖ Insurance rates have quadrupled and many recovered
owners along the coast continuously face closures due to inability to make
the insurance premiums.
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Summary
Communities and businesses on the Mississippi Gulf Coast have lived
through the impacts that Hurricane Katrina brought to the area. This research
investigates the real life experiences of ―recovered‖ small business owners in
Hancock County, Mississippi and outlines strategies for future use.
Interpretations and perceptions of the hurricane‘s impact differed among small
business owners; however, each respondent shares his experience of the same
event, which provides for rich accounts of the recovery process. Summarizations
of the strategies occur through four themes identified within the data: expansion
of customer base, community collaboration, adjustment of business objectives
and personal or self-insurance. As evidenced by the preceding results, the
qualitative and quantitative results confirm each other and the emerging themes
accomplish the study‘s research objectives
Chapter IV presents a synopsis of the relationship between the data and
research objectives. The chapter also gives an overview of the individual stories
of five business owners and the four themes captured through survey and indepth interviews. Chapter V discusses the summary, conclusions, implications
and recommendations for future research.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Summary of the Study
This research discusses the disaster recovery process undertaken by
small business owners after Hurricane Katrina. The study investigates the lived
experiences of small business owners in Hancock County, Mississippi.

recovered business owners, were identified. RO-1 determines strategies
―recovered‖ small business owners in Hancock County, Mississippi implemented
during Hurricane Katrina recovery relative to financial barriers to recovery. RO-2
and RO-3 explore strategies ―recovered‖ small business owners in Hancock
County, Mississippi, implemented pre-and-post-Hurricane Katrina in preparation
for future disasters. Lastly, RO-4 identifies characteristics of a resilient small
business owner as perceived by ―recovered‖ small business owners in Hancock
County, Mississippi.
To address the research objectives, the researcher utilized a mixed
methods research design. This approach allows the collection of a broad range
of information and confirmed findings from different data sources (Creswell,
2003). Newman & Benz (1998) suggest the mixing of qualitative and quantitative
approaches maximize the strengths of both methodologies. In order to
accomplish the research objectives of this study, a structured online survey was
disseminated to 40 members of the OTBMA (13 completed), followed by five in-
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Four research objectives, which determine strategies and characteristics of
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depth face-to-face interviews. Data collected reveals four themes, which address
the study‘s research objectives.
Alesch et al. (2001) evaluates business owners‘ ability to recover from
natural disasters. The research documents that business owners who recognize
and adapt to the post-event market for goods and services and those servicing
customers throughout a widely dispersed area were more likely to recover after
experiencing a natural disaster. The study also found that, ―the longer a business
is unable to supply its previous customers with services, the less likely the
business will survive‖ (Alesch et al., 2001, p. 21). During the process of
analyzing data from the current study, the researcher found small business
owners in Hancock County, Mississippi successfully utilized similar criteria to
Alesch et al. (2001) recovery characteristics. Many of the key recovery
strategies outlined by small business owners in this study mirror factors
suggested by Alesch et al. (2001).
The findings of this research contribute to small business owners‘
understanding of necessary strategies needed to recover from a natural disaster
such as Hurricane Katrina. Overall, the data offered during data collection
indicate that the following concepts are important to the recovery process:
expansion of customer base, community collaboration, adaptation to new
business environment and self-insured recovery. The themes show direct
relationship to the study‘s research objectives. The themes are preventive
measures, if implemented pre-disaster or in a timely manner post-disaster, can
possibly streamline the recovery process.
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As local Mississippi communities experienced the financial burden of
Hurricane Katrina, business owners created pathways to new clientele. The first
finding involves expansion, a concept undertaken by business owners in an
attempt to provide products or services to customers outside of the Hancock
County region. In order to address financial barriers to recovery businesses
utilized Internet marketing as an effective tool to accomplish the expansion of
customer base. Likewise, businesses began to transport product to other regions
to sell within different markets. This strategy aligns with Alesch et al.‘s (2001)
idea of servicing a widely dispersed area and addresses recovery strategies that
can be implemented pre-disaster.
Also in alignment with prior research, business owners developed
strategic partnerships to help rebuild and reopen. Without the help of insurance
companies or the federal government, owners developed reciprocal agreements,
which allowed sharing of financial resources. The collaboration permitted the
division of rebuilding costs and therefore increased the efficient and timely
allocation of resources to restore operations. Business owners took in other
businesses or reopened in a shared building. Quick reopening meant
reestablishing the ability to offer an acceptable level of services to customers.
Developing strategic partnerships serve an important role in business owner‘s
recovery process. This research suggests that as networks of businesses
collaborate to support each other in the recovery efforts, the chance of becoming
a resilient business increases.
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Concurring with concepts reported by Alesch et al. (2001), a businesses‘
ability to adapt to new business environments by adjusting business objectives
and identifying strategies implemented post-Katrina for future disaster recovery
remains critical. Owners adjusted business objectives after Katrina to meet the
demands of the new post-hurricane environment. Reorganization of business
objectives attributed to business sustainability and recovery. Self-insuring is
another strategy businesses utilized during recovery.
Although not directly addressed in prior research, the concept of selfinsurance during recovery was predominant throughout the study. The theme
addresses RO-1, strategies implemented during Hurricane Katrina recovery
relative to financial barriers to recovery. Owners suggest the decision to assume
the loss associated with Katrina rebuilding, rather than rely entirely on insurance
policies to cover the risk was essential due to the lack of access to capital
caused by support agencies. Businesses either utilized personal finances, while
awaiting financial aid, or began saving funds to reopen. Without personal
finances, recovery seemed impossible due to payment time gaps caused by
insurance and government agencies. Insurance companies and federal help
agencies lost the respect and trust of many business owners, as evidenced by
increased plans to self-insure in addition to obtaining adequate insurance
coverage.
Discussion and Conclusions
After analyzing field notes and observations made during interviews, the
researcher drew two conclusions worth discussion.
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Conclusion One: Need for Adequate Disaster Preparation
RO-1 and RO-2 determine strategies implemented by business owner‘s
pre-and-post-Hurricane Katrina to prepare for future disaster. The research
suggests that small business owners lacked formal disaster planning pre-Katrina
and the findings support the conclusion that business owners experienced
hurricane fatigue pre-Katrina.
Alesch et al. (2001) suggests that traditional precautions taken by most
organizations in the wake of a disastrous event will not significantly increase the
probability of business survival. Business owners conducted the basic evacuation
procedures with the notion that the normal procedures would suffice. According
to small business owners in this study, businesses on the coast are accustomed
to threat of hurricanes; hence, due to that normalcy, seriousness of preparation
diminishes. The research suggests repeated preparation caused the process to
become redundant; thus, appearing to produce apathetic business owners.
According to the population in this study, each time a business owner prepares
for an approaching storm, especially when the storm fails to affect the expected
area, the owner remains less likely to prepare sufficiently for the next storm.
However, this attitude could remain dangerous for businesses operating in an
area high-risk to hurricanes. According to this research, evaluation of hurricane
intensity and effective preparation and recovery strategies remains critical.
Based on the data from this study, businesses choosing to operate in
high-risk hurricane areas willingly accept a defined level of risk and issues in
order to conduct its day-to-day operations. Frequent evacuations remains one
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issue business owners endure. As owners locate within a high-risk area, they
accept the threats that can disrupt the delivery of products or services to
customers. According to Childs (2008), adequate preparation enriches business
survivability and ample preparation must occur each time a hurricane
approaches. Exposure associated with a risk is mitigated by adequate
preparation and planning (Childs, 2008).
Recommendation One: Development of Disaster Briefing Literature
Findings of this research support the conclusion that effective disaster
planning is critical. It is essential that accurate information concerning effective
planning protocol and Katrina recovery strategies be dispersed in an easily
readable, easily accessible format. The researcher recommends the
development of briefing literature (i.e, brochures or podcasts), which document
recovery strategies revealed through this study. Developing a manuscript of
effective disaster planning and recovery guidelines could prove beneficial to the
small business community and provide knowledge of critical disaster preparation
tasks.
Conclusion Two: Actual Financial Recovery
Research objective one sought to determine strategies ―recovered‖ small
business owners in Hancock County, Mississippi implemented during the
Hurricane Katrina disaster relative to financial barriers to recovery. Findings from
this research suggests that small business owners were not fully prepared to
recover from the financial impacts of Hurricane Katrina as indicated by continued
financial struggles. In accomplishing research objective one, the research
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findings support the conclusion that business owners lacked an understanding of
the extra expenses associated with recovery. After Katrina, business owners
reopened and soon discovered the extra costs required to maintain business
operations. Drastic changes occurred in business revenue necessities; thus the
amount of revenue required to conduct business post-Katrina exceeded the
revenue required pre-Katrina. Alesch et al. (2001) suggest that an organization‘s
ability to be resilient often relies on its ability to prepare, manage and adapt to
transitions during the crisis. Hurricane Katrina was a transitional moment in the
financial stability of small business owners and business resiliency depended
upon the ability to adapt to the new financial environment. Survival in the new
Bay St. Louis economy requires increased business profits. The mandatory
increase was in part due to the insurance crisis following the storm (Braley,
2007). Insurance rates are four times higher than pre-Katrina; therefore, revenue
required to sustain business operations needs to increase four times. The lack of
understanding of the insurance crisis and the impact on business created a false
sense of recovery for many owners. Post-Katrina, owners lacked accurate
revelation of the necessities for financial success in the new business
environment. Without acquiring knowledge of the actual costs of recovery, the
research suggests that small business owners will continuously struggle to
sustain business operations.
Recommendation Two: Examination of Financial Requirements
Alesch et al. (2001) suggests that smaller, financially weaker businesses
and those under significant stress before the event typically do not survive the

123
disastrous event. Therefore, the researcher recommends that local small
business owners in conjunction with government officials examine financial
requirements for recovery, as well as insurance rate and recovery timeline trends
post-Katrina. Other means of examining Katrina trends, such as collaborating
with federal agencies to assess Katrina‘s disaster recovery experience, should
be explored. Data produced by this collaborative effort can introduce
improvements to the recovery process and offer best practices for future
disasters. According to this research and prior extant literature, businesses that
are financially educated and prepared pre-disaster are more likely to survive
post-disaster.
Study Limitations
This study is limited to the responses and experiences of the ―recovered‖
small business owners who operated businesses in Hancock County, Mississippi
during Hurricane Katrina. The decision to focus only on ―recovered‖ business
owners was made because the owners attained knowledge of effective recovery
strategies utilized during Katrina; therefore, these respondents could address the
study‘s research objectives. Businesses, which did not recover, were less likely to
provide information specific to this study‘s objectives.
The uniqueness of the Katrina experience of this study‘s respondents may
limit results and inferences to that specific business. Sample size and selection
bias are two limitations that can potentially decrease generalization of this study‘s
results.
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Sample Size
With sample size as an easily identifiable limitation to this study, questions
arise as to whether the sample size, eleven business owners, is large enough to
represent all small business owners affected by Hurricane Katrina. Ability to
generalize the findings requires consideration. However, utilizing a mixed
methods research design to collecting the data reduces the inconsistency or
variability. Additional studies conducted, using larger sample sizes, may allow
for more expansive conclusions and broader generalizations.
Selection Bias
The researcher limited this study by selecting only small business owners
from Hancock County, Mississippi as the sample population. The decision was
based on the premise that business owners from Hancock County were hardest
hit by Katrina, as the eye of the storm made landfall there (U.S. Census Bureau,
2009). The results of this study are therefore, shaped in the perspectives of
small business owners from Hancock County and not from small business
owners across Mississippi. The researcher contends that this limitation
strengthens the study in that the population experienced direct impact of the
hurricane; hence, received the most damage. As such, these small business
owners were more likely to give additional insight or implications that may
influence business recovery processes.
Future Research
Based on the outcome of this study, the researcher recommends that
additional studies on practical steps business owners can take to prepare for
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disaster recovery are examined further. As such, the researcher offers the
following recommendations for further research.
The current findings were derived from ―recovered‖ business owners in
order to accomplish the study‘s four research objectives. However, there are
additional lessons learned which ―non-recovered‖ business owners have the
ability to contribute. Further research can collect pertinent data concerning the
Katrina disaster from small business owners who did not reopen after the
hurricane. This information could prove useful by adding actions detrimental to
recovery to the extant literature.
The research objectives of this study explored the strategies implemented
by small business owners during Hurricane Katrina recovery relative to financial
barriers to recovery; strategies ―recovered‖ small business owners in Hancock
County, Mississippi, implemented pre-and-post-Katrina in preparation for future
disasters and identified characteristics of a resilient small business owner.
Duplication of this study utilizing a larger and more diverse population to verify if
strategies from the current research are transferable to larger businesses could
prove valuable. Evaluating whether the results of this study would simulate
across a broader spectrum of businesses, considering size, geographical
location and business type could serve as another area of academic research.
The research could determine if recovery strategies are different based on size of
the business. Larger businesses are responsible for more employees, larger
budgets and adhere to more governmental regulations; these specifics
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characteristics may influence the response to natural disasters or affect recovery
time.
In the history of the United States, Hurricane Katrina ranks as the most
expensive natural disaster to hit the Gulf Coast Region (Dass-Brailsford, 2008).
The U.S. Department of Transportation (2006) classifies Hurricane Katrina as the
highest loss ever recorded from a single storm measured by loss of life,
destruction to property and economic hardship. Along the Mississippi Gulf
Coast, over 235 confirmed deaths were reported (Pender, 2005) and over 68,000
homes and businesses destroyed (Editor‘s Notebook, 2005a). Although small
businesses in the U.S. have experienced great devastation from natural
disasters, other countries share in that experience. Disaster recovery themes
identified in the current research include: expansion of customer base,
community collaboration, adjusted business objectives and personal or selfinsurance. The second area helpful in bridging the gaps in the available disaster
research includes utilizing the current research findings to influence small
business recovery processes in other countries. Many countries experience
natural disasters, which adversely affect their small business communities. In
2004, Sumatra, Indonesia endured the Indian Ocean Tsunami (―Deadliest
Tsunami‖, 2010), in 2008, China experienced the Sichuan Earthquake (―Sichuan
Earthquake‖, 2009) and in 2010, Port-au-Prince, Haiti experienced a devastating
earthquake (―Haiti Raises Earthquake Toll‖, 2010). Findings from the current
study‘s research objectives can be utilized to investigate and analyze business
recovery strategies and resiliency characteristics in the aforementioned
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countries. The strategies outlined by the population of this study could aid
recovery planning and management practices in other countries.
Concluding Remarks
The conceptual framework of this study outlines the financial barriers to
recovery faced by small business owners in Hancock County, Mississippi and
identifies strategies utilized by small business owners post-Katrina to overcome
those barriers, thus establishing business recovery. This research has
successfully revealed the strategies used by the participants of the study as
expansion of customer base, community collaboration, adjustment of business
objectives and self-insuring.
The review of literature and responses expressed during data collection
confirms that Hurricane Katrina presented challenges to affected Gulf Coast
communities (Scurfield, 2008). Rebuilding of infrastructure, homes and
businesses represent a small portion of recovery challenges the communities
faced (Waugh et al., 2006). However, Katrina not only brought challenges but
opportunities. The opportunities lay in the possibility of redevelopment of large
tracts of land cleared by wind and flood (Waugh et al., 2006). Thus, an
opportunity exists to rethink the economic bases of damaged Gulf Coast
communities.
This research suggests that Hurricane Katrina had a great social impact
on the well-being of the Hancock County community; however, resilient small
business owners participating in this study hold an extraordinary sense of
endurance and community. Business owners continuously repeated that material
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things lost in Katrina were temporal; hence, the people and connection with
others in the community were irreplaceable. This realization comes from
surviving such enormous tragedy. The stories expressed during this research
were those of panic, horror and trauma; however, they were also stories of
triumph and courage. The participants of this study experienced the
psychological, emotional and financial impacts of Hurricane Katrina; yet survived.
Small business owners on the Mississippi Gulf Coast operate under uncertain
and unpredictable weather conditions. Businesses in hurricane prone areas will
continue to face the threat of disaster; however, with knowledge and effective
recovery strategies in place, businesses can conquer the uncertainty with
success. As each hurricane season comes and goes on the Mississippi Gulf
Coast, small business owners brace themselves for the worse as they hope for
the best.
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APPENDIX A
INTRODUCTION LETTER
Calling All “Recovered” Small Business Owners Who Conquered Katrina!
Please help! The Hancock County small business community is invited to participate in
a research study of the recovery process from Hurricane Katrina.
Allow me to introduce myself. My name is Madonna Adams, a PhD student at The
University of Southern Mississippi. I am currently conducting dissertation research
entitled “Recovering from Hurricane Katrina, Small Business Owners Conquer Katrina:
A Mixed Methods Study.”
Purpose
 The purpose of this study is to explore recovery for small business owners post
Hurricane Katrina. Strategies used by “recovered” business owners to overcome
barriers to recovery will be examined.
How to participate





The research study consists of an online questionnaire, which will only take
approximately 20 minutes of your time. Answering the questions involves no
foreseeable social or physical risks and participation is strictly voluntary.
Following the questionnaire you may be selected to participate in an hour and a
half focus group interview which will provide in-depth knowledge of the recovery
strategies your business used after the hurricane. Interviews will be conducted at a
convenient location for business owners.
Data collected and will be kept confidential.

What’s in it for you?



This research will make strong contributions to the recovery of Hancock County
now and in the future. Recommendations based on research findings will help you
and future small business owners better prepare for natural disasters.
Results will be shared with the Old Town Bay St. Louis Merchant’s Association
and individual member businesses.

Thank you for your cooperation in this important initiative. Your participation is
invaluable.
Madonna Adams
Phone: 337-257-1665
Email: padams1@alumni.lsu.edu
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APPENDIX B
SURVEY INSTRUMENT
Name of Business ________________________________

1. A small business is defined by the Small Business Administration (SBA) as one that
is independently owned and operated, is not dominant in its field of operation,
typically has revenue considerably less than comparable units within a larger
corporation and has less than 100 employees. Is your business considered a small
business?
YES 



NO



2. Is your business located in Hancock County, Mississippi?
YES 



NO



3. Was this business in operation at the time Hurricane Katrina made landfall on August
29, 2005?
YES 



NO



4. Is this business currently in operation?
YES 



NO



*** If you have answered ‘NO’ to any of the questions 1-4, please press submit now.
If you have answered ‘YES’ to questions 1-4, please continue survey.
5. What is the gender of the business owner(s)?





Male
Female
M/F Team

6. What type of business did you operate just prior to Hurricane Katrina?




Retail
Manufacturing
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Service
Other, please specify ___________________________

7. At the time of Hurricane Katrina, how long was your business in operation?






1-4 years
5-9 years
10-14 years
15+ years

8. Market or customer base for the goods or services provided by your business, 2005
and now.
2005

Now






Mainly local
Mainly regional
Mainly national
Mainly international






9. Please indicate whether any change has occurred since the hurricane in each of the
areas below. If change has occurred-whether it was an increase or decrease-place a
check in the last column if you believe that is (at least to some degree) related to the
hurricane.
Decreased

A. Number of employees

Remained
The Same

Increased

Was due
to the
hurricane?

























at the business?
B. Number of customers or
clients served?
C. Business profits?

10. Was the building housing your business, its contents, or attached property physically
damaged as a result of the hurricane?
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YES 



NO



11. If yes, what was the nature of the damage to the business property? (Check all that
apply)










Structural damage to building
Damage to buildings non-structural elements
(Windows, Light fixtures, Partitions, Water Pipes, etc.)
Damage to furnishings (Desks, Cabinetry, etc)
Damage to equipment (Computers, Machinery, etc.)
Damage to inventory or stock
Damage or loss resulting from looting
Other damage (What?)_____________________________________
_____________________________________________________________

12. How extensive was the physical damage to the building that housed the business?






Very little to no damage
Minor damage
Major damage, but still possible to use
Total loss, impossible to use building

13. How disruptive was this physical damage to your ability to do business?






Not disruptive at all
Not very disruptive
Disruptive
Very disruptive

14. Was the business closed or inactive for any period of time as a result of the hurricane?
YES 



NO



15. In total, how many hours (if less than one day) or how many days was the business
closed as a result of the hurricane?
____________
____________

Number of Hours (if less than one day)
Number of Days
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16. Whether the business closed temporarily or remained open, did the business
experience losses in sales, revenues, or gross income as a result of the hurricane, for
example, because customer spending declined?
YES 



NO



17. If yes, what is your best estimate of the losses the business sustained in sales,
revenues, or gross income within the first year after the Hurricane?
$ _____________
18. In the first year or two after the hurricane (2005-2007), did the business experience
any of the following problems that were hurricane related? (PLEASE CHECK ALL
THAT APPLY)













Employees unable to get to work
Employees missing time to attend to personal matters
Damage to owner’s own residence or other properties
Decline in customer need for goods/services
Owner’s vulnerability to cash flow
Problems caused by federal agencies (FEMA, SBA etc.)
Lack of access to capital for recovery
Serious infrastructure problems within city (Bridges and roads out, no
electricity, couldn’t deliver products or services due to transportation issues
etc.)
Could not get supplies/materials needed to run business
Could not afford to pay employees
Business did not experience any of these problems

19. At the time of the hurricane, was this business property covered by insurance?
YES 



NO



20. What type of insurance did the business have? (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY)
  Insurance to cover wind damage
  Insurance to cover flood/water damage
  Insurance to cover crop damage/agricultural losses
  Business interruption insurance
  Other (What?)
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21. Did the business apply to the Small Business Administration (SBA) for a loan to
cover hurricane-related losses?






Yes, for property damage
Yes, for economic injury/business interruption
Yes, for both property and economic injury
No

22. What was the outcome of the loan request?







Loan approved, received all funds requested
Loan approved, did not receive all funds requested
Loan approved, but decided not to accept
Loan application denied
Other (What?)____________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________

23. Without giving any confidential financial information, please describe the state of the
business at two points in time—just before Hurricane Katrina struck in 2005, and at
the present time. Check the item that best describes your business in 2005, just
before the hurricane and now.
2005

Now

Business financial condition,
2005 pre Katrina and now
In financial trouble; marginal
Not in financial trouble but
not doing well
In good financial condition
In excellent financial condition













24. In the list that follows, please check all the items that apply to your business before
the hurricane and in the years since the hurricane. For your business, have you or
your employees:
Did before
Hurricane
Received written
information on
hurricane preparedness

Did since
hurricane
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Talked with those
working in your
business about what to
do in the event of a
hurricane
Purchased insurance to
cover flood damage to
your business?
Developed a business
disaster recovery plan,
covering what to do if a
hurricane strikes?
Conducted hurricane
drills or exercises for
your employees?
Made arrangements to
move the business to
another location in case
of a hurricane?
Purchased special
windows, shutters, or
protective materials to
prevent wind damage?
Stored tarps, sandbags
or other materials for
protecting the structure?
Obtained an emergency
generator for use if
electrical power fails?
Been involved in any
hurricane preparedness
or response training
programs for your
employees?

VOLUNTARY Focus Group Participation:
Are you willing to participate in a focus group interview regarding your businesses‘
recovery from Hurricanes Katrina? If yes, please complete contact information below.
Thank you for your participation in the survey.

Name: ___________________________________________________
Business Name: ____________________________________________
Contact Address: ___________________________________________
Contact Phone: _____________________________________________
Contact Email: _____________________________________________
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APPENDIX C
FOCUS GROUP INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
1)
a.

Crisis Planning for Natural Disasters
Did you (as a small business owner) have any formal plans established on how to
conduct your business before, during or after a natural disaster?
 If you had a formal plan, was it written?
 What was included in the plan?
 Were your employees aware of this plan? If so, how was it communicated?

b.

Did you have a plan to protect the physical assets within your business?

c.

Did you have insurance to cover your business (inventory, fixtures, etc.); your
income; your employees’ income?



d.

e.

2)

Were there obstacles to receiving payment for damages?
Did your insurance cover what you thought it would?

Was there a plan to handle the financial aspects of your business, given the
likelihood that local banks would also suffer damages?
 e.g, how would you gain access to cash/credit needed to make necessary repairs,
purchase new inventory.
Do you have a business disaster plan in place now?
 What have you done to prepare for another disaster?
 What plans do you currently have to handle financial aspects or physical assets
within your business?
Crisis Management for Natural Disasters

a.
How did you deal with the effects of the hurricane immediately prior to it hitting
your town (removing inventory, reinforcing windows and doors, helping employees
evacuate, securing business records and computers, boarding windows, leaving town
etc.)?
b.

How soon were you able to get back into your business to assess damage?
 If more than a day, what prevented you from gaining access to your business?

e.

What percentage ($value) of your inventory and or equipment was lost?

f.

Did you receive any assistance (physical) from Chamber of Commerce, fellow
business owners; city/state/federal government; customers?
Recovering From The Natural Disaster (Resiliency)

3)
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a.

Please describe the damage sustained by your business.

b.

How long did it take to resume business after the hurricane?





What had to happen to get your business back up and running?
How much did it cost?
Please describe the financial strength of your business prior to Katrina
Please describe the financial strength of your business following Katrina

c.

In the recovery process did you experience problems caused by federal assistance
agencies (FEMA, SBA etc). If so, what were they?
 What did you do to deal with the problems caused by federal assistance
agencies?

d.

Did your business suffer due to infrastructure problems (bridges & road closures,
lights and electricity outages) caused by Hurricane Katrina?
 What did you do to overcome the problems?

e.

After the hurricane, was your business vulnerable to cash flow problems?
 What strategies did you use to deal with the vulnerability to cash flow?

f.

Do you feel that your business experienced a lack of access to capital for recovery
after Hurricane Katrina? (availability of resources and their effect on ability to carry
on).
 Was your business insured prior to Katrina and did you experience any
problems filing claims or receiving claim payments?
 What specific steps did you take to overcome this barrier?

g.

Why did you choose to stay in (city)?

h.

If you could identify one thing that has contributed most to your business’ ability to
re-open, what would it be?
 Who or what have been the most helpful in your recovery?

i.

What aspect of the hurricane and its aftermath has been the most difficult for you?

j.

If you faced a situation like this again, what would you do differently?
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APPENDIX D
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL
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APPENDIX E
PERMISSION TO USE DRC SURVEY
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